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Chapter 4. Faith, Messianicity, and Radical Evil: The “Kantian” Transposition
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72 4 Faith, Messianicity, and radical Evil: the “Kantian” transposition i In “Faith and Knowledge,” Derrida inquires into the very sources of the religious, in an attempt to uncover the fundamental structure of “religiosity .” And yet he proceeds with a sense of caution or “restraint” that is made a theme within text itself. Derrida begins “Faith and Knowledge” by asking: “How ‘to talk religion’? Of religion? Singularly of religion, today? How dare we speak of it in the singular without fear and trembling, this very day? And so briefly and so quickly? Who would be so imprudent as to claim that the issue here is both identifiable and new? Who would be so presumptuous as to rely on a few aphorisms?”1 Similarly, he begins the second part by directly invoking the need for a certain reticence or scruple with regard to this concept. Religion? Here and now, this very day, if one were still supposed to speak of it, of religion, perhaps one could attempt to think it in itself or to devote oneself to this task. No doubt, but to try above all to say it and to utter a verdict concerning it, with the necessary rigor, which is to say, with the reticence, modesty, respect or fervour, in a word the scruple (religio) demanded at the very least by that which is or claims to be, in its essence , a religion. As its name indicates, it would be necessary, therefore, one would be tempted to conclude, to speak of this essence with a sort of religio-sity. In order not to introduce anything alien, leaving it thus intact, safe, unscathed.2 In light of this reticence, it comes as something of a surprise when, shortly thereafter, Derrida writes: Religion, in the singular? Response: ‘Religion is the response.’ Is it not there, perhaps, that we must seek the beginning of a response? Assuming , that is, that we know what responding means, and also responsibility. Assuming, that is, that one knows it—and believes in it. No response, indeed, without a principle of responsibility: one must respond to the 73 T H E “ K A N T I A N ” T R A N S P O S I T I O N other, before the other and for oneself. And no responsibility without a given word, a sworn faith, , without a pledge, without an oath, without some sacrament or ius iurandum.3 This passage is crucial for an understanding of “Faith and Knowledge.” Despite all of the hesitations, Derrida ultimately responds to the question of the meaning of religion by linking it to responsibility. But the definition of religion as response is itself a response: “Response: ‘Religion is the response.’” If religion is linked to the response and therefore responsibility, then one can already anticipate that such religion will be caught in the same quasi-transcendental aporia as justice. On the one hand, responsibility addresses the other in his singularity; and yet, the responsibility to any singular other involves a sacrifice of other others. This sacrifice of other others means that one is forced to calculate with a responsibility that must nevertheless remain incalculable. Responsibility—and by extension, religion—is therefore, like justice, impossible. Concerning this relationship between responsibility and sacrifice, Derrida writes, in The Gift of Death: [W]hat binds me thus in my singularity to the absolute singularity of the other, immediately propels me into the space or risk of absolute sacrifice. There are also others, an infinite number of them, the innumerable generality of others to whom I should be bound by the same responsibility, a general and universal responsibility (what Kierkegaard calls the ethical order). I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others.4 While for Kant the notion of religion derives from the moral law, Derrida ’s understanding of religion derives from the notion of the unconditional and its aporetic relationship to the generality of the law. Derrida posits two sources of “religion.” These two sources are not faith and knowledge, as the title misleadingly suggests, but faith (or belief ) and holiness (or sacredness). Derrida writes that “religion” marks the “convergence of two experiences that are generally equally held to be equally religious”: “the experience of belief, on the one hand (believing or credit, the fiduciary or the trustworthy in the act of faith, fidelity, the appeal to blind confidence, the testimonial that is always beyond proof...