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3. The Bodily Self
- Northwestern University Press
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56 3 The Bodily Self Thus far, I have argued that the dimension of hyletic-kinesthetic selfaffection equals to a primal sense of selfhood, shown how this affective sphere is localized, and clarified the sense in which the self has a perceivable exteriority. What, accordingly, is the relation between the self and the lived-body? I will answer this question by first specifying phenomenologically the notion of selfhood in relation to activity and passivity. On the basis of Husserl’s writings, I will distinguish between active, passive, and active-passive self-affectivity and discuss the respective modes of selfhood : “agency,” “ipseity,” and “habituality.” I will examine the manner in which these modes of selfhood are embodied, and then investigate how the self may be “expanded” through practical incorporation of tools and equipment. This will enable me to provide a systematic elaboration of the transcendental and empirical features of the embodied self. Agency, Ipseity, Habituality Hyletic sensing is not something that we can actively execute or generate , but something that happens to us. Therefore, whether we are talking of activity or passivity in the level of sensibility depends solely on the mode of our kinesthetic self-affectivity. When kinestheses are freely executed, we speak of activity. We move ourselves (turn our head, raise our hand, shut our eyes, walk and jump) and in correlation with these free movements, the environment appears differently. Even if we cannot generate or control our hyletic sensations by will, we can shut our eyes, turn our head, move closer, and grasp the object that hyletically affects us. This kind of self-affectivity is an active one, a matter of active selfhood or “agency.” Kinestheses are also often operative without being actively executed , and therefore we should distinguish a mode of selfhood where movements are executed (in the sense that one could also refrain from them), but executed habitually, without explicit activity. As Husserl puts it, the self not only “exercises itself” (übt sich), but also “habituates itself” (gewöhnt sich): it “‘acquires’ capacities, posits goals, and, in attaining 57 T H E B O D I L Y S E L F these goals acquires practical skills.”1 Indeed, most of our self-movement is habitual in this sense. Habitual movements are not “passive” in the sense that they merely occur or happen to us (like accidents or strokes of luck), but neither are they actively executed. They presuppose activity, but the necessary activity remains non-thematic and implicit. Such movements are “passively active,” they pertain to our habitual selfhood. In contrast to the above-mentioned, passive selfhood equals to a mode of selfhood that completely lacks what Husserl calls “kinesthetic effort” (kinästhetische Streben).2 Here we must distinguish between kinesthetic effort and kinesthetic awareness: even when we are not kinesthetically active (not even in the sense of habitual activity), we are nevertheless kinesthetically self-aware. Even forced movements are sensed kinesthetically , and even if we lie down and refrain from all active self-movement, we are still kinesthetically self-aware.3 Our kinesthetic self-awareness does not simply disappear when we cease all our active movement. We are still aware of our bodily posture and the positions of our limbs. Moreover , during our active and habitual self-movements, there are many processes that remain purely passive but are still felt kinesthetically. For instance , the functioning of our eyelids, our heart, and digestion is neither actively nor habitually controlled by us.4 This passive self-relation accompanies all possible awareness—even dreaming. This passive and minimal form of selfhood is called “ipseity.” Agency, habituality, and ipseity are not mutually exclusive, but different modes of our immediate self-relation. Let me illustrate this with an example. When watching a bird fly by, we are not mere passive beholders of the scenery; we not only see, but watch the bird fly by. We follow the bird by moving ourselves (our head, eyes, upper body, etc.) and in this sense our perception is active—as Alva Noë puts it, “perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do.”5 Moreover , as already indicated, a particular movement of the body is at the same time a movement of the whole body. When watching the bird, we actively turn our head toward the bird, but this movement is supported by the adjustive movements of our shoulders, of our upper back—and so on. That is to say, our purely active movements are embedded...