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169 Concluding Remarks By introducing embodiment into the midst of the transcendental dimension , Husserlian phenomenology restores intuitivity to transcendental philosophy and revises the transcendental tradition on the whole. At the same time, this move makes phenomenology more responsive and open to empirical sciences. To be sure, Husserl consistently emphasizes that there is a limit to possible naturalizing: “the spirit can be grasped as dependent on nature and can itself be naturalized but only to a certain degree”; “subjects cannot themselves dissolve into nature for in that case what gives nature its sense would be missing.”1 Yet, while strongly holding on to this position, and without losing sight of its own unique transcendental character, Husserlian phenomenology succeeds in opening the needed dialogical connection between transcendental philosophy , naturalism, and the empirical sciences. As I see it, it is precisely a thorough phenomenological examination of embodiment that is able to clarify why subjectivity can neither be simply reduced to the world nor understood as something extra-worldly altogether, and this is what I have tried to contribute here. The central task of this book has been to investigate the constitutive significance of embodiment in Husserlian phenomenology. I have focused on explicating the diverse roles of embodiment in the constitution of selfhood, intersubjectivity, and objective reality, and it is now time to recapitulate and develop further some of the most crucial achievements and consequences of these analyses. The investigation commenced with an analysis of self-awareness. With Husserl, I introduced subjectivity as an affective dimension, as the realm of kinesthetic and hyletic self-awareness, and argued that due to its fundamental affective structure subjectivity originally constitutes itself in relation to something that is other to it. Conceived in this manner, subjectivity is not a closed immanence that would first have to find a way out of itself, but rather a lived relation between interiority and exteriority . This lived relation is originally realized in, or rather realized as, the lived-body, and to say that self-awareness and awareness of the environment are equiprimordial is just another way of saying that subjectivity is fundamentally embodied. 170 C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S However, as I stressed repeatedly, the claim that subjectivity is embodied is not exhausted in the claim that subjectivity has a lived-body. Subjectivity is not only intentionally aware of a particular body belonging to it, but it is also embodied in the deeper sense of being kinesthetically and hyletically self-aware. I clarified the complex structures of embodiment by employing Husserl’s distinction between Innenleiblichkeit (i.e., immediate kinesthetic-hyletic self-manifestation) andAussenleiblichkeit (i.e., the lived-body as it is constituted in double sensation, the livedbody as an object for itself), and I argued that even though in the sphere of sensibility subjectivity necessarily localizes itself in the exterior, this by no means compromises its transcendental, constituting, character. Having illustrated the indispensable constitutive significance of embodiment in the primordial self-constitution of subjectivity, the analysis was developed further and expanded by an investigation of the multiple and layered significance of embodiment in the constitution of intersubjectivity and intersubjective self-constitution. I distinguished three kinds of intersubjectivity—a priori, social, and generative-historical intersubjectivity—and argued that, in different senses, each of these necessarily involves embodiment. First, the structure of perceptual experience implies, a priori, the co-positing of a plurality of anonymous co-perceivers. In this connection, I reinterpreted the Husserlian Jedermann as “anybody,” and explicated the embodied foundations of a priori intersubjectivity. Along with Husserl I argued that social, reciprocal relations can be established only among embodied subjects: reciprocity presupposes that others are experienced as being able to perceive us. Moreover, I explained how empathy is essentially built upon a priori intersubjectivity, in the sense that the empathically appresented other is necessarily constituted as a particular “exemplar” of the anonymous “anybody.” At the same time, I emphasized that this by no means compromises the alterity of the other. A priori intersubjectivity is, in this sense, a necessary but not a sufficient ground for empathy, and our factual encounter with others undoubtedly introduces our experiential life with something unprecedented—the actual other endows our consciousness with “the first true transcendence,” as we saw Husserl arguing.2 Moreover, I investigated how, in and through social relations, subjectivity constitutes itself as a person among others and eventually grasps itself as a finite member in a historical tradition that “lives on” regardless...

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