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7. Primordial and Intersubjective Normality
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121 7 Primordial and Intersubjective Normality Thus far we have been discussing subjectivity in relation to itself and in relation to others, and the centrality of embodiment in both relations has been highlighted. This final part focuses on the significance of embodiment in the constitution of objective reality. The preceding part was concluded with the claim that even though subjectivity is sedimented and even though it constitutes itself as an intersubjective being, subjective-primordial awareness is not thereby replaced by the intersubjective one: intersubjective constitution cannot lack firstperson perspective. Accordingly, primordial self-constitution cannot be subordinated or reduced to intersubjective self-constitution. The phenomenological relationship between primordial and intersubjective constitution must be investigated in detail, since this will enable the clarification of the significance of embodiment in the constitution of objective reality. It is striking, at first glance, that while Husserl elaborates the features of intersubjective world-constitution, he excludes the “anomalous” and the “abnormal” from the constituting intersubjectivity. However, as will become clear later on, the “exclusion” (Ausschaltung)1 in question is not an act of discrimination or devaluation: it is not a result of an act of deliberation, and it involves neither degradation of, nor disrespect for, the subjects in question. Husserl is not claiming that we should decide to exclude the anomalous, but he is instead describing one particular structural feature of our experiencing, a mode of constitution. The problem of normality arises already at the level of primordial experience. Namely, when for instance we hear something, we take this something as being there for anybody, but precisely thereby we tacitly “restrict” these horizonal, co-constituting others to those with a proper sense of hearing. Accordingly, one only needs to consider the deaf in order to realize that normality has a role to play in the constitution of the objective world. In general, “anybody” does not mean all sensing beings whatsoever, but exclusively normal perceivers. This brings to light the essential asymmetry or dissymmetry of intersubjective experiences: it is never quite the same to constitute a perceived thing as something that others 122 P R I M O R D I A L A N D I N T E R S U B J E C T I V E N O R M A L I T Y should be able to perceive as well, and to constitute what others claim to perceive as something we ourselves should be able to perceive.2 In the first instance, the “measure” of perceiving the thing in the right manner resides in the abilities of the self, whereas in the latter this “measure” is defined by the abilities of others. Along with the essential asymmetry, we also find the constitutive hierarchy that was discussed already in part 2. Just as the intersubjectivehistorical dimension is essentially constituted for subjectivity in the course of its individual genesis, and refers back to it, so too the norm as defined by the abilities of others—the “intersubjective norm”—can be constituted only on the basis of, and in relation to, the norm as defined by the abilities of primordial subjectivity—this is the “primordial norm.” This asymmetry and duality can be further illustrated with an example. As we come to know that there are blind subjects, this does not motivate us to think that we ourselves experience features (e.g., colors) that do not actually exist. On the contrary, we immediately—before reflecting upon the issue—consider these others as constitutively anomalous or “deviant ” in the sense that they do not perceive the visual environment which is there for “anybody.” In other words, the perceptual abilities of the blind do not rule out our intersubjective experience of the colors, which means that—in respect to the constitution of the visual realm—the experiences of such subjects are not “normatively significant” like those of the seeing ones. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that the blind, as well as other anomalously perceiving subjects, can nevertheless be “constitutively significant” in many other respects: they contribute to the constitution, say, of the tactile world, the auditory world, the practical world, and the historical world, and in this sense they are participating members of transcendental intersubjectivity. In this sense, as I will argue in detail, the constitution of the objective world involves normative structures: the world appears as being there for anybody, but “anybody” does not refer to all perceivers whatsoever , but only to normal perceivers. Yet, as I will also clarify, due to...