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Acknowledgments I would like to thank the following publishers for kind permission to reprint here the works for which they continue to hold the copyright. Chapter 1 first appeared as “Neo-Kantianism” in A Companion to Continental Philosophy, ed. Simon Critchley and William Schroeder (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1998). Chapter 2 was first published in Kant-Studien 87 (1996), but it had been written for another project in 1985 and had been in circulation since then. Chapter 3 was published in Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition, ed. Robert Sokolowski (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988). Chapter 4 first appeared in The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 23, no. 3 (1992). Chapter 5 was published as “Making Logic Philosophical Again (1912– 1916),” in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). Chapter 6 appeared in Man and World 28, no. 4 (1995). Chapter 7 appeared in Phenomenology Japanese and American, ed. Burt C. Hopkins (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998). Chapter 8 was published in History of Philosophy Quarterly 14, no. 2 (1997). Chapter 9 was originally published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 3 (1990). Chapter 10 was published in Husserl in Contemporary Context, ed. Burt C. Hopkins (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). Chapter 11 first appeared as the entry “Phenomenology and the Question of Being: Heidegger” in The Edinburgh Encyclopedia of Continental Philosophy, ed. Simon Glendinning (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). Chapter 12 appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, no. 2 (2000). Having incurred many debts, intellectual and otherwise, during the fifteen years sedimented in the chapters of this book, it would be hard to dojusticeheretothespecificwaysinwhichIhavebenefitedfromthehelp, criticism, and support of so many people. I would have to start by thanking Karsten Harries and Robert Sokolowski, both of whom have been mentors of the first rank, and I would have to acknowledge in memoriam an even deeper debt of gratitude to Maurice Natanson, who introduced me to phenomenology and so, in a sense, to philosophy. More concretely, my xi xii A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S work has been materially supported by the generous travel stipends and enlightened leave policy of the School of Humanities at Rice University, and I would express my gratitude to Allen Matusow, former dean of the school, and to Judith Brown, the current dean, for fostering, in this and other ways, an environment in which scholarship can flourish. In the same vein, I should thank the members of the Philosophy Department at Rice for their collegiality; it is hard to overestimate the importance of mutual respect in these contentious times. The members of the Continental Theory Workshop, an interdisciplinary faculty group sponsored by the Center for the Study of Cultures at Rice, also deserve thanks for the constant intellectual stimulation that has kept me focused on fundamental issues. In particular Jack Zammito, Harvey Yunis, Lane Kauffmann, and Tullio Maranhão have forced me to be very specific about what phenomenology can contribute to interdisciplinary discussion. But how would it be possible to acknowledge all those who have done so much to foster my thinking about Husserl and Heidegger? Many of these chapters were aired in their raw, naked form at meetings of the Husserl Circle and of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, and a list of those to whom I owe thanks would have at least to include those who attended these sessions. But even so it would be wrong not to express special thanks to Burt Hopkins, who has provided an outlet for several of my essays and has always been a trenchant interlocutor in matters concerning the Husserl-Heidegger relation. Similarly, much of what I have done over the past several years would not have attained whatever acuteness it possesses had it not been for Theodore Kisiel, whose generosity with his time and great knowledge of Heidegger have been a constant provocation to my thinking. A different sort of provocation, and one for which I am no less grateful, has been provided by Hubert Dreyfus and the many who, having learned from him, do not, in our discussions together, make my Husserlian reading of Heidegger any easier, only better—among whom special thanks go to Charles Guignon, William Blattner, and John Haugeland. All the more grateful am I, then, for the many conversations about matters Husserlian that I have been fortunate...

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