Notes
157 Notes Introduction: Rhetoric, Emotion, and Places of Persuasion 1. See Clanchy, ch. 9, “Trusting and Writing.” 2. See Butler: For rhetoric, he could not ope His mouth, but out there flew a trope. . . . Else, when with greatest art he spoke, You’d think he talk’d like other folk, For all a rhetorician’s rules Teach nothing but to name his tools. (Hudibras 11.81–82, 87–90) 3. See Worsham, “Eating History,” 145. 4. The articles on which the book is based are the following: “Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue,” “Aristotle’s Rhetoric on Emotions,” “Aristotle: Animals, Emotion and Moral Virtue,” and “On the Antecedents of Aristotle’s Bipartite Psychology.” 5. See the project outline at , n.d. 6. In the first instance, Micciche, in “Emotion, Ethics, and Rhetorical Action,” cites Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey, Rhetoric of the Human Sciences, ix; in the second, she quotes from Simons, Rhetorical Turn, 17. Micciche’s essay focuses on recent treatments of emotion in composition studies (161–84). See also Bouson, “True Confessions,” for a study of professional “emotional troubles” (625). 7. See LeDoux, Emotional Brain, “Emotion and the Amygdala,” “Emotional Memory Systems in the Brain,” and “Emotion, Memory and the Brain”; and Aggleton and Mishkin, “Amygdala.” 8. Kerford attributes the pedagogic method of question and answer to the Sophists and locates its source in Socrates (Sophistic Movement). See also Beck, Greek Education, 197. 9. Said’s Orientalism names Western representations of Asian and midEastern cultures that justify Western dominance as “Orientalism,” a highly contested term. 10. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a10–1172a15. 11. Citation of Gorgias, Encomium of Helen (MacDowell translation and cited by his line numbers), in Register, “Logic and Validity.” 12. See also Swanson, Public and the Private. 13. The tenor of many antique examples of envy catalogued in Walcot’s Envy and the Greeks also identifies this emotion as a political force; for instance, a funeral speech by Lysias sees envy and jealousy as direct causes of war among the Greeks. 14. See Gill, “Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions ?,” 126–29. 15. See Bataille, Accursed Share; and Clement, Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan, 134: “The same goes for women as for madmen: in a manifest position of exclusion, they keep the system together, latently, by virtue of their very exclusion ” (emphasis in original). 16. Peter Green’s full translation of the poem retains its sense of simultaneous feelings, not the “approach/avoidance” imposed on it by some: “I hate and love. You wonder, perhaps, why I’d do that? / I have no idea. I just feel it. I am crucified” (Catullus, Poems of Catullus 191). 1. Decentering Rhetoric 1. See Murphy, Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts, xiv–xv. 2. See Poster, “Pedagogy and Bibliography.” See also Brandes, History of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 3. See also John Guillory, “Canon,” 237. 4. For instance, Ringvej cites deliberations of the Argives in Aeschylus’s Suppliants as evidence of a full-fledged democracy as early as 508 bce in “Interpretation of a Political Idea,” 239–61. Cited by Pernot, review, 12–14. 5. Nonetheless, this information is successfully retrieved in many cases by those reading papyrological evidence; see, e.g., Bagnall, Reading Papyri. 6. See also K. Robb, Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece, “The Greek Alphabet.” 7. For the commonality of handbooks, see Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 19. For the thought processes attached to the alphabet, see Havelock, Literate Revolution , esp. 8: the alphabet “converted the Greek spoken tongue into an artifact, 158 Notes to Pages 17–42 thereby separating it from the speaker and making it into a ‘language,’ that is, an object available for inspection, reflection, analysis.” 8. Arguments on both sides include Fox, “Ancient Egyptian Rhetoric”; Cole, “Who Was Corax?”; and Grimaldi, “How Do We Get from Corax–Tisias to Plato –Aristotle in Greek Rhetorical Theory?” Cicero refers to the Sicilian origin of rhetoric in Brutus. 9. This oversimplified logic is not far from Hugo Rabe’s 1931 updating of Christianus Walz’s Rhetores Graeci, which describes the return of democracy to Syracuse: “The people had produced an unsteady and disorderly state of affairs, and he [Corax] thought that it was speech by which the course of human events was brought to order. He then contemplated turning the people toward and away from the proper course of action through speech” (Rabe, Prolegomena 270 qtd. in Schiappa, 43). 10. See Koziak, Retrieving Political Emotion, 30. 11. See Wisse, Ethos and Pathos, 7. 12. See Griswold...
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