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Chapter 8. The Empirical Theory Concerning Origin and Nature of the Moral Judgment
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[Chapter 8.] The Empirical Theory Concerning Origin and Nature of the Moral Judgment 141. This is but an application of the general logical method. The following implications: (1) observation and collection ofspecial cases, (2) comparison of these cases, (3) induction of a general principle by the calculation of consequences . Certain of our experiences bring pleasure; certain, pain. Empirical logic is always monistic. Having observed a large number of instances, the experiences are collected, compared, as Mill lays down in his Logic. We find the common element in experiences leading to pleasure (same for pain) and draw an induction. There is no consciousness of right or wrong in the experiences themselves. Ofcourse, certain things may not be discussed under empirical theory in general, as [the1ideal of [the1hedonists, etc. 142. When it is said that the moral experience is evolved out of the nonmoral , it is not meant that the evolution is [in] becoming conscious of moral values in the non-moral experience. They are evolved out of it in the sense that certain external consequences are evolved from the non-moral experience, and by reference to them the experience is moralized. 143. Criticizing the logic [of empiricism1it appears: (1) The examination of moral experience involves an ideal already implied, to give a basis for observation and classification ofexperiences. Otherwise the mind would not know which ofa multitude ofcases to pick out. For example, Darwin must have had some kind of a working hypothesis before he began his work of classification. Otherwise it would simply be found that everything is everything. Thus the empirical logic always begs the question. (2) The comparison of the cases involves an implicit standard ofvalue; as in observing , there is an ideal. It is the value attached to certain cases, not in the great number of cases collected. On the theoretical side, it is not true that these experiences have the common element. In A, B, C; F, H, C; G, K, C; C is not there obviously. The scientific process consists in discovering the C which is not apparent . If certain qualities had been on the surface, we would not have had to wait for Darwin for the Darwinian hypothesis. The differences left over, A, B; F, H; were explained on the ground of special creation. Evolution does not seek to get other common elements but explains how the differences arose. The identity is defined; the differences are integrated. Thus, empirically, it is most important to know what standard to apply. The unity has to be assumed, but must be allowed to expand to explain differences. 68 Lectures on the Logic ofEthics (3) There is always a general relationship between the particular instances and the generality inducted from these instances. It is a common saying that induction can never be certain though a strong presumption may be made. All induction rests on the uniformity of nature. Another supposition, of the uniformity of nature, rests on induction. Thus opposition arises because there is no organic connection between the common element and the divergences. Therefore , it is a matter of chance if the common element is found in the next thousand cases. The fact that we get the practical assurance is because the mind cannot believe but that there is an identity. The scientific man enlarges his universal when he finds an exception. He does not set it aside, but makes it his business to search out the exception. This is unaccountable on the basis ofempirical logic. 144. The process in ethics, then, cannot be purely empirical but presupposes a rational factor which directs it. We must know the quality of experience so as to know what kind ofknowledge will be derived. This rational factor, the assumption of unity, is itself an assumption. We find by examination that experience is always working toward an end and this is the rational factor. There is an implicit element in experience which, by development, becomes explicit. 145. The moment the non-moral experience becomes conscious itself, it becomes moral. This is the evolution ofthe moral sense. The biological experience itself is a moral experience; the latter is not simply super-added. Because empiricism is always implying an ideal and a standard, always using a rational element , though denying its existence, the empirical method is always in a state of confusion. The empirical philosophy will always make out a good case but always because a rational element is put in. 146. Ethical empiricism is always alternating between an uncertainty so great as...