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[Chapter 4. Intellectual, Aesthetic, and Moral Value]8 88. The next step is to attempt to classify the various types ofvalue which this qualitative realization assumes: the logical or intellectual, the aesthetical, and the moral. 89. The previous account is in a way incomplete. While the logical process has to be treated as a process ofmediation, the intellectual process, to the person pursuing it, becomes an end in itself. The process oflearning appeals to us on its own account. But this learning also is experience. It is a process of mediation and yet it is itself immediate. The intellectual interest is essentially an interest in the fact of the tension. It implies the setting and the solving of a problem. Apart from problems there is no intellectual interest. Curiosity, wonder, scientific method all imply this problem. This shows but positive meaning and limitation of its meaning. The tension must be developed to have any consciousness. It is an interest in the fact and form of tension, rather than its content. 90. The intellectual interest is in the copula as formal, in the factors independent of their relation and union. This means that the development of self is not here deep enough for the implication of the self in the material to be recognized . The self is that which operates on the material, but the facts which are operated upon are not seen to have any organic relation to the self. That means again that the tension is not felt to be in and of the self in its deepest sense. The tension is given to the self, and all mind has to do is to find out the tension and state it properly. It is not realized that the tension is actually the outcome of the self, the doings ofthe self. Unless we do know where the tension is, successive activity cannot be full. It is more or less blind and tentative, [and] is working without a knowledge ofthe facts to be unified. When interest goes beyond the interest to find and state what the tension is, then the interest becomes aesthetic. 91. It seems sometimes that a contradiction is stated when it is said that the intellectual process is one ofmediation, and yet has a value in itself. It is the purpose which is mediate. It is a fact of itself, and thus has a value in itself; and there is no contradiction in saying that it is preparatory to something else. The truer it is at the time, the more is its value in the function to be used. A person making a watch, ifthinking too much about the purpose, will not do his work best. Yet this thought ofthe purpose gives the criterion for the correctness ofthe parts and their adjustment with each other. A person interested in a scientific pursuit must be interested in the investigation for its own sake. If he is too much concerned with the question of its possible good or evil outcome, he will be dis54 Lectures on the Logic ofEthics 55 qualified for the scientific investigation. But the more the outcome is realized the deeper will be the intellectual interest. The intellectual interest is in an abstraction , but the function of the abstraction is to lead up to the concrete whole. It is an error to try to make the process come out at a predetermined end, as was done in the middle ages. 92. On the ethical side the two abstractions appear again. The intellectual interest is the proper sphere of the tension. The ethical interest is in arresting the tension-the intellectual interest-at a certain point and turning it to some practical end. The more a person's intellectual interest is developed, the more adequate is his treatment ofthe tension, e.g., the man who sees conflict between capital and labor in relation to their development finds intellectual but not moral antagonism.9 93. The moral antagonism is the setting up of one thing against another in action. This is the intellectual distinction arrested. It is not true that society will be better without antagonism or tension, but that tension is in its proper moral place in the intellectual sphere, i.e., as furnishing the conditions of action but not the principles of action. If the antagonism is accepted as a fixed fact, the development is distorted. The intellectual antagonism furnishes more things to unify. 94. Aesthetic Value. These three values are not three things. They are simply...

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