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SECTION VIII The Relation of Desire and Good to the Self 1. Is Desire Essentially Selfish? Lecture XXII. March 1, 1901 THOSE WHO INSIST upon the introduction ofa purely transcendental good as the ideal standard of conduct do so as a rule because they have a low opinion of the nature of desire and consequently a low opinion ofwhat the satisfaction ofdesire consists in. The point ofconnection with the problem just indicated is as follows: Holding the end or object of desire to be pleasure, or if not literally pleasure at least some form ofagreeable experience, some form ofdistinctly sensuous, sensible satisfaction, they generalize that by saying that all desire taken in and of itself without some control by higher power is selfish and, in and of itself, aims at results in the way ofpleasures which are purely private and personal in character; that pleasure or enjoyment is simply an increment of the selfs own states; that pleasure as such is a state of feeling, of consciousness which does not extend in any way beyond the individual experiencing it. Accordingly, good which satisfies desire is, by the nature ofthe case, private and selfish good. And then it requires the other power, that ofmoral reason, to present a good which is universal in character, common, public, and not merely personal. The fundamental point, as indicated in the last lecture, is: What is the desire? What sort ofan activity is it? Until we answer that question we have no ground for assuming that the satisfaction ofdesire is ofa low or morally unworthy quality. Ifa desire is essentially and intrinsically quasi-physical or merely sensuous in character, then the satisfaction of it will be of a similar character. Ifthe desire is simply an expression 199 200 John Dewey ofthe life process and the various particular desires or wants are simply the forms into which the life process differentiates under a variety of conditions or in adaptation to a number of factors in the environment, then unless life itself is merely physical or sensible, an unworthy or degrading thing, there is absolutely no ground for assuming a deprecatory view of desire and the satisfaction of desire. What is the ground, theoretically or practically, for assuming that the desires are selfish? The want of food, the appetite of hunger, may be taken as a typical example ofa desire which would be called physical or merely sensuous. If any desire is self-regarding, egoistic, as distinct from the so-called classes ofdesires which are roused by reason, altruistic or benevolent, having regard for law, it would, I should suppose, be the desire for food. Yet, as indicated before, the desire for food is simply the craving of the organism through which life is maintained, to keep itself in a healthy condition adequate to its work. Suppose a plow were endowed with an appetite so that every dulling of the plow led it to reassert itself as a plow, led it to try and remedy the loss and reinstate itselfas a plow. Wherein would that self-assertion be selfish in the bad sense ofthe term? Ifthe plow is a useful instrument, ifit has a function in any way desirable, social, would it not be highly desirable from the social point ofview that the plow should have this craving to maintain itself in a fit condition as a plow? Is there not more than an analogy between that and the demand for food as expressed through the physical organism? If the body is an essentially unworthy thing, then ofcourse the struggle of life to maintain itselfthrough the body or to maintain the body in proper condition will have to be regarded as an undesirable thing. But certainly no one, except some extreme ascetic or possibly no one except a pessimist like Schopenhauer, has gone to the point of holding that it is really better for the whole thing to be snuffed out and for life entirely to cease to maintain itself. Is there any middle ground between saying that any assertion ofthe soul to maintain itself through the body by the securing of food is an evil thing and the other statement that the desire for food, taken for what it is in its own purpose, is just as right and fit and in one sense morally as high as anyotherpossible end oraim? Isthere any alternative between the two positions? Is there anything got by merely modifying the appetite, curbing the desire for food? Is it desirable that...

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