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SECTION IV The Moral Self: A Broad Overview 1. Aspects of the Self Lecture VIII. February 1,1901 THIS (THE MORAL self) is the fundamental problem on the psychological side and even more on the ethical. In one sense the selfmust be identified with the entire process. An adequate discussion would bring in the question ofthe relation of mind and body. But the point here is that the total or integral character involves the processes in consciousness and those not in consciousness. In so far as those not in consciousness influence those in consciousness they are a part of the self. The psychological point comes in in localizing definitely this interconnection . This is done in two different ways: (1) identifying the self with what we are struggling against, (2) identifying the self with what we are struggling for. The second point I will carry out further. In terms of the previous analysis it would be this: We sometimes identify the self with the projected activity. This is not the entire process but only one phase. On the moral side, in speaking of the ideal self, the larger self, and terms of that sort, we clearly have in mind the movement we are projecting or anticipating, in spite ofthe fact that we have not yet reached it. The psychological counterpart of this is the image process. The ideal self of the child, in the original illustration, is putting the cover on the box. It is the experience or activity in which those two things come together. The other thing with which we sometimes identify ourselves may be represented by the habit. That is by the coordination or function established, in so far as being already there, not projected or antici133 134 John Dewey pated, it tends to isolate itself. The habit self of the child, as against his ideal self, would be the tendency of either one of his previous activities to function along the same lines again. Of course it occurs to you at once that the example breaks down at the fundamental point because there is no self there, or at least no reason for putting it into the child's image ofour consciousness. He will think of getting the cover on the box, think of it not in the sense that the image influences his action-he may have a dim anticipation of it which influences hand and eye activity-but it would obviously represent a more mature state of consciousness if he consciously brought a selfinto the thing at all. And certainly he would not think ofpersisting in the older activity as if that were himself. That defines the problem, which is this: When do these elements appear consciously as such? That is to say, when do we bring in the self-value? The answer is that, when in the tension, any ofthese factors is consciously recognized and used as the basis of further control and direction, then it consciously becomes to us the self. We would explain in the first place why we shift around in this variable way. Why will a man at a new opportunity say to himself sometimes, "It's no use; I'm too fixed; my habits are all formed"? In other words, "That is not me; I am these habits; and they are me to such an extent that not only is the other not me but it will not become me." At other times a man would consciously identify himself with this opportunity, would find himself in that and would look at habits, however firmly established, not as really himself but as simply more or less external obstacles to be overcome. He is looking towards the ideal. The statement made would explain how that might be. It would depend on which factor was being used as the basis of operations, the center from which to proceed in solving this tension and reaching the new coordination. If that factor were in complete control of the situation , controlling and directing all a man's activities, then it would not consciously present itself as the self. Another person looking at it, or the same person looking back on it later might discover the selfelement but at the time he would not bring himself into it. This is illustrated by cases of nonvoluntary attention of a primitive type and ofmore advanced type. A person thoroughly absorbed in music is unconscious of himself as a distinctive factor in that. If conscious of himself it shows...

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