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11. Brice’s Cross Roads
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242 11. Brice’s Cross Roads Ihad inferred from what General Sturgis had said to me at our interview near Ripley that we were to move forward on the Ellistown road, more to the right and southward. But he afterwards sent me word that he had concluded to advance on the Fulton road, which we were then on, seemingly without making any further effort to deceive the enemy as to our intentions or movements. In accordance, therefore, with the general’s instructions, I took up the line of march indicated and proceeded slowly about eight miles and encamped my division at Stubbs’ plantation, about fourteen miles southeast of Ripley. It was by such tedious movements the cavalry was obliged to continue the advance, while in our rear, plodding along through the rain and mud, the infantry and doomed train came slowly on, eight miles a day, to “punish Forrest” and the dare-devil rebels under his command; while they were watching our tardy movements, concentrating their forces, and choosing their position to attack us. It should be remembered, too, that on the evening of June 7, we had found a brigade of rebels on the New Albany road south of Ripley, and that the same day Kargé had entered Rienzi on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and had drawn a large part of Buford’s division of Forrest’s command in that direction. All subsequent information went to show that the rebels were massing troops to attack us and oppose our advance, and these facts were repeatedly made known to General Sturgis. At Stubbs’ plantation, where we had found some forage, I again informed the general that I was confident from what I had learned then and the day previous that the enemy was in large force and not far off. Learning that the mules of the train were exhausted and in bad condition after their great exertion in pulling the heavily loaded wagons through the deep mud in which they were frequently mired thus far, I advised the general to remain where he then was, as the position was a good one, and that in my judgment the enemy would attack us there if no further advance was made. Our chances for victory would be greatly strengthened if the infantry and artillery could be quietly put into position Brice’s Cross Roads • 243 for battle, while the cavalry, unencumbered, continued to operate in such manner as to fully develop the enemy’s strength and draw him forward to a general engagement. The general, however, could not believe that the enemy in any large force was anywhere near us, or that we would be attacked where we then were. He seemed inclined to rely on the information given him nearly two weeks previously by General Washburn to the effect that “the enemy would not be found in force nearer than Tupelo or Okolona,” although later reports and developments had proven the contrary. In the face of all this evidence repeatedly placed before him to guide his action, and which should have been duly heeded, he still decided to continue the advance, with his troops scattered out in one column on the same road. The general seemed gloomy and irritable, and in a very decided manner ordered me to proceed early on the morning of June 10, with my division , and “to keep it well in advance of, and out of the way of the infantry and train,” directing me to march on to Baldwyn. [He] peremptorily ordered me to attack the enemy wherever he might be found, stating that he would follow promptly with the infantry, well closed up, and proceed to Guntown. His orders to me were imperative, and gave me no discretion whatever but to go on and attack the enemy on sight. General Sturgis had taken the 19th Pennsylvania Cavalry from my command at La Fayette for his escort. Deducting the number of sick men and worn-out horses sent back from Ripley, I did not have left in my two brigades over 2,400 enlisted men and officers, mounted and effective for duty, when I took the advance with them on the Baldwyn and Guntown road from Stubbs’ plantation as ordered. After marching in a cautious manner three or four miles, I halted, as usual, for over one hour to give time for the infantry and train to close up. Presuming that the general with the main column would follow closely...