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11: No Quarter
- Southern Illinois University Press
- Chapter
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11 No Quarter Sheridan arrived at Harpers Ferry on 6 August 1864 and took command of the Army of the Shenandoah the next day. He had nearly 35,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry awaiting his orders, including the 6th and 19th Corps, which Grant returned to the Shenandoah Valley along with two battle-hardened cavalry divisions. It was a sizeable army that the Confederates were hard-pressed to match.1 Sheridan began his advance from Harpers Ferry on Wednesday, 10 August, and within three days he learned the perils of partisan warfare in the Shenandoah Valley. Early’s army was at Bunker Hill, and Sheridan planned a flanking maneuver that would defeat the Confederates. He expected a short campaign and did not bring his supply wagons south. Sheridan’s advance was rapid. By the next day, his army was eight miles south of Winchester, but Early’s retreat up the valley prevented a decisive battle. The campaign began taking longer than he had expected. Now, Sheridan needed those wagons from Harpers Ferry, and he ordered Brig. Gen. John Kenly to escort a supply train to Winchester by Friday evening.2 The wagon train consisted of 525 supply and headquarters wagons. Wagons of the cavalry formed the rear of the train, with those of the Cavalry Reserve Brigade rearmost. Kenly’s infantry brigade and a battery of artillery were detailed to escort the wagons, but Kenly’s brigade was insufficient for such a large supply train. He positioned two companies of his 3rd Maryland Potomac Home Brigade at the head of the train and dispersed the remaining companies, one every 20 wagons. Kenly also had two regiments of Ohio National Guard to escort the train. The 149th Ohio guarded the center of the train, one company stationed every 30 wagons. The 144th Ohio watched the rear section, one company every 20 wagons and two companies posted behind the rearmost wagon. Kenly assigned one section of artillery to the head of the train, another in the center, and the third section at the rear. It was not a particularly strong guard. The Ohioans had enlisted for only 100 days, and their term of service was set to expire in just a few days; and the battery never joined the train.3 It took most of Friday, 12 August, to organize and outfit the supply train. Not until 4:15 p.m. were the last of the wagons ready to move. The route to Winchester no quarter followed the Valley turnpike from Harpers Ferry south through Berryville before turning west to Winchester. The head of the train reached Buck Marsh Creek, one mile north of Berryville, at ten o’clock that night. There, the wagons parked while the teamsters fed and watered their mules and the guards rested. Kenly ordered the march resumed after ninety minutes. However, the wagons were strung out and the train was so long that the cavalry wagons did not reach the creekside stop until after those of the infantry corps had left. Kenly expected these rear wagons to shortly resume the march. Instead, the drivers parked their wagons, unhitched their teams, fed and watered their mules, and slept. Confusion abounded. No one could find the officer in charge of this section of the train. The Ohioans in the rear guard lay on the ground asleep. No pickets watched for raiders. Finally, at six o’clock on the morning of Saturday, 13 August, as the head of the train approached Winchester, the rear cavalry wagons broke camp and began moving. The wagons of the Cavalry Reserve Brigade at the rear of the train were the last to move out.4 On the evening of the twelfth, as the train headed toward Berryville, Sheridan ’s army was at Cedar Creek, and Sheridan fretted about the supplies. He knew Kenly’s brigade was small for the escort, but still he expected the wagons to arrive the following day. The specter of Mosby haunted Sheridan, though, and that evening he directed the 8th Illinois Cavalry to cross the Potomac River into Loudoun County “to exterminate as many of Mosby’s gang as they can.” Kenly, too, was anxious that night. As the lead wagons pulled out of Buck Marsh Creek and started for Berryville, he disclosed to his officers that he considered this to be “the most dangerous point in the route” and expressed concern to make sure every wagon passed through safely. Sheridan and Kenly had...