Chaim Perelman

Chapter 5: Arguing from the Structure of Reality

CHAPTER 5 Arguing from the Structure of Reality U nlike quasi-logical arguments, which try to counterfeit logical or mathematical structures, a second kind of associative technique relies upon the audience’s conception of reality in order “to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (The New Rhetoric 261). The purpose of this chapter is to explore the nature of these arguments and determine how they fit into Perelman’s rhetorical enterprise. We must stipulate at the outset that Perelman’s personal ontological and epistemological views are not germane to the present inquiry; his rejection of both the “realist” and “nominalist” positions was documented in an earlier chapter; and it could be added that in none of the writings we have examined does Perelman either posit or reject the existence of a “purely objective ” reality apart from human experience. From the rhetorical rather than the philosophical standpoint, however, as F. H. van Eemeren and his colleagues interpret the Belgian philosopher as saying, any speaker basing an argumentation on the structure of reality “will be bent on making his [or her] audience believe that he [or she] is presenting an inevitable picture of reality” (van Eemeren et al. 234). Such a view of reality would be antithetical, of course, to Perelman’s regressive philosophy, which holds that even the facts, truths, and presumptions upon which a view of reality is based consist only of “the best tested of our opinions”; and it bears repeating that all argumentation is predicated upon the belief system of the intended audience. It should also be reiterated that individual arguments cannot always be confined to single, discrete categories in Perelman’s typology. As we have just seen, quasi-logical arguments sometimes mimic the pattern known as deduction . Yet the arguments to be examined presently are also based upon the 54 chaim perelman syllogistic principle whereby a conclusion is deduced from a particular view of reality (i.e., a major premise) already accepted by the audience. If the notion that “all men are mortal” were not firmly embedded in human consciousness , the famous conclusion concerning Socrates’s mortality would not be psychologically compelling. It is not at all inconsistent (or incompatible , as Perelman would prefer to say) to maintain that such a pattern of reasoning is both quasi-logical and is based upon the existing worldview of an audience. With this caveat in mind, let us look closely at two kinds of liaisons that connect judgments already accepted by an audience with those the speaker wants to establish. Sequential Relations Arguments built upon liaisons of succession correspond to the area of logic traditionally termed “causal reasoning,” which involves the forging of connections between events or phenomena that occur in a temporal sequence. Into this group Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca place the “pragmatic argument ” (which evaluates an act or event on the basis of its consequences); arguments concerning ends and means; and the arguments of “waste,” “direction ,” and “unlimited development.” When pragmatic arguments are used, a speaker tries to draw conclusions about the existence or value of a thing by evaluating it in terms of its favorable or unfavorable consequences. In effect, the arguer seeks to transfer the positive or negative opinions an audience holds toward an act or circumstance to the agent or condition alleged to have caused it. During the 1930s, for example, Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana relied heavily on pragmatic argumentation to inveigh against the scandalous maldistribution of wealth in the United States. Between the “haves” and “have-nots” a great chasm yawned, a condition that, as Long insisted, caused millions to struggle in poverty while a few lived in splendid luxury. In a radio broadcast on February 23, 1934, the senator hurled blast after blast against the ten or twelve economic titans who, he declared, had accumulated more individual wealth than the other 120 million Americans combined: The greed of a few men is such that they think it is necessary that they own everything, and their pleasure consists in the starvation of the masses, and in their possessing things they cannot use, and their children cannot use, but who bask in the splendor of sunlight and wealth, casting darkness and despair and impressing it on everyone else. (Ryan 39) Arguing from the Structure of Reality 55 The Great Depression constituted an unquestioned calamity—an economic certitude of the highest order—for Long’s radio listeners on that winter night; and upon that reality he sought...