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127|7{ Big Black, Black Powder, Brush Fires Grant notified Sherman on June 22 that the enemy was crossing the Big Black, and it appeared Johnston intended to attack along Bear Creek. He told Sherman that Parke had already begun marching four brigades and cavalry to meet the threat. Parke’s assignment would be to hold the Rebels as close to Big Black River as possible “until their position is clearly defined when we can draw all our forces from Snyders Bluff and the forces previously indicated here to their support. [Brigadier General James] Tuttle[’]s Division should be marched out within supporting distance of Parke at once. You will go and command the entire force.” Sherman had the option to handle logistics as he pleased, and he could draw troops from Snyder’s Bluff and the three brigades from McPherson’s corps. Sherman could do all these things without checking with Grant. Grant, in effect, gave Sherman an independent command, required by the supposed emergency. Grant promised additional troops from the Union left flank if needed.1 Grant’s renewed panicky demeanor led to a June 23 message to General Herron: “Heavy firing is reported on our left. Is it in your front? What are the indications?” Before receiving Grant’s inquiry, Herron had sent word that, if allowed, he could force his way into the Rebel siege lines. The next day, Herron sent two messages to Grant, one of which read, “Nothing of special importance has occurred on my front since yesterday .” His sharpshooters were leading an advance against enemy siege lines and should be dug in by nightfall within four hundred yards of the 128 | big black, black powder, brush fires main Rebel front. There had been a brief skirmish, but Herron had few casualties: one killed, one wounded.2 Before he received Herron’s note, Grant sent a message to McPherson that Ord had heard shooting on his left. Perhaps Confederates had sent a patrol. Could McPherson detail forces if needed? McPherson likewise had heard what sounded like heavy fighting on his left and assumed it must be Ord’s corps. Grant quickly sent Ord word not to fire unless “you see something to fire at.” Ord responded that he was hearing heavy firing on his left, “as if a Sally,” (usually implied troops rushing out, firing and falling back); Ord sent word to his left-wing commanders to support each other in case of a full-scale attack. Ord also said he needed heavy artillery. The shooting turned out to be a Confederate sortie that amounted to practically nothing. Grant’s words indicated he continued in an up and down pattern of emotions. Johnston’s lack of action only occasionally modified Grant’s reactions.3 Grant contacted Sherman about getting word to Herron and Andrew Jackson Smith to be ready, and Sherman could pull two additional brigades from his own corps without endangering the siege line. Grant stated firmly, “Should Johnston come, we want to whip him if the Siege has to be raised to do it. Use all the forces indicated above as you deem most advantageous, and should more be required, call on me and they will be furnished to the last man here and at Young’s Point.” Grant had obviously had enough of being concerned about what Johnston would do. If only he had known he was losing sleep over nothing.4 Sherman wrote one of his typically long messages to Grant detailing his troop deployments, including what roads they were on and how he would be communicating with Parke. The time on his letter was 11 a.m., June 23, and he wrote he intended to go to the Big Black that afternoon: “I hear nothing of Johnson at all, no traces of him or signs of his approach . The Country is ill adapted to Large masses.” The terrain made it difficult for even a regiment to form a solid front. Sherman thought the only way to attack Johnston was to wait for him to cross the Big Black. If he did, Sherman assured Grant, the Confederates would be beaten back. Osterhaus would block all roads leading directly from the Big Black into Vicksburg. Sherman mentioned the Iowa cavalry skirmish with Rebels, but he, obviously, did not think it a harbinger of things to come. Some local citizens seemed to think all Sherman’s troops had come out to find the Confederates who attacked the Iowans. Sherman promised Grant, “I...

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