Grant at Vicksburg: The General and the Siege

6. Closely Hemmed In

107|6{ Closely Hemmed In On June 8, Grant updated Halleck on siege operations: “Vicksburg is closely invested. I have a spare force of about thirty thousand (30,000) with which to repel anything from the rear. This includes all I have ordered from west Tennessee. Johnston is concentrating a force at Canton, and now has a portion of it west of Black River. My troops have been north as far as Sartartia, and on the ridge back to that point there is no force yet. I will make a waste of all the Country I can between the two Rivers [Big Black and Yazoo]. I am fortifying Haines’ Bluff, and will defend the line from here to that point at all hazards.”1 Grant had issued orders on May 28, telling all his corps generals as well as commanders in charge of detached troops along the Union lines and eastward to picket every road in their rear that provided entrances and exits to Vicksburg. Pickets must “prohibit all persons coming into or going out of our lines without special authority,” which usually meant from corps commanders. R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant general, distributed General Order No. 44 under Sherman’s name on June 9 to underscore Grant’s determination to seal Vicksburg. Smugglers, who were Joe Johnston’s couriers, would from time to time get small-arms supplies to Pemberton, but many of them were captured. Order 44 states, “To prevent communication between the enemy, now closely invested in Vicksburg , and their friends and adherents without, the following rules must be observed on the north front: A continuous chain of sentinels must extend from the Mississippi River to the main Jackson road.” The order 108 | closely hemmed in elaborated on particulars, but the gist of it was clear: Johnston’s infiltration efforts must be stopped. This was not good news for citizens who had rushed into Vicksburg from outlying areas nor for the city residents who had remained despite the threat posed by Grant’s inland campaign. They would have trouble getting out now, though some would be given permission to leave. The closer Grant got to victory, however, the less inclined he was to provide passes for citizens. Grant, surely, heard about cave dwellers who sought refuge from artillery and about the damage to homes in town by Union guns and artillery. The remaining residents had made their choice, however, and he intended to capture Vicksburg, no matter the hardships.2 Grant’s earlier optimism in a May 24 report to Halleck that he did not see how the Confederates could raise the siege had begun deteriorating within days after he wrote it. Ever since, Johnston continued to weigh heavily on Grant’s mind, despite the absence of any real threats from the Confederate general. Most reports about Johnston’s activities had either been exaggerated or out of context. Johnston’s cavalry roamed about, but he certainly would need much more than cavalry to pose a major problem for Grant. Halleck promised him additional reinforcements to handle threats from the Mechanicsburg Corridor. Though the perceived problems Johnston could cause cast a shadow over Grant’s thinking, he knew he had to be aware of the remainder of challenges he faced in keeping Pemberton boxed in. He looked to Louisiana across the Mississippi.3 Elias Dennis commanded the District of North Eastern Louisiana, the area across from Vicksburg that most concerned Grant. The fight at Milliken’s Bend had happened there, and Grant knew he must secure the region. There seemed little chance that Confederates in Louisiana could break the siege, but they could harass Union vessels and clog logistical support. They must be dealt with. Grant sent Joseph Mower’s brigade to Dennis, though Grant made clear that Mower would only remain temporarily to help Dennis drive the Confederates far enough way to eliminate threats. If Dennis needed more, Grant promised they would “be promptly sent.” He wanted the Rebels pushed beyond the Tensas River and Monroe: “Every vestige of an enemy’s camp ought to be shoved back of that point.” Dennis must protect supplies but not at the expense of his men. Grant did not order, “not being on the ground myself,” Dennis to make certain dispositions, but he suggesting fortifying Milliken’s Bend and Lake Providence.4 The southern flank of his siege line continued to concern Grant. He still could not afford to assume the Confederates would not try to break [18.217.208...