Hunting Nazis in Franco's Spain

Conclusion

162 conclusion The United States struggled to find the proper way to deal with General Francisco Franco’s dictatorial regime after World War II. Both at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 and in the Tripartite Statement of March 4, 1946, the United States condemned the Franco regime as incompatible with the emerging postwar order and took the lead in releasing captured German documents that demonstrated Spain’s close relationship with the Nazis. The United States removed its ambassador to Madrid, Norman Armour, in December 1945 and replaced him with only a chargé d’affaires, Phillip Bonsal, who was followed by Paul Culbertson in 1947. This was in line with the U.N. condemnation of Franco’s regime; while diplomatic relations were permitted, they should not be at the highest level. The United States did not send another ambassador to Madrid until Stanton Griffis was appointed in February 1951. However, the United States never sought to overthrow Franco, despite tentatively broaching the idea Franco’s retirement with elements of the Spanish army, the anti-Franco opposition , and the dictator himself in spring 1947. The complexity of the relationship between the Western Allies and Franco’s Spain became increasingly clear as the Cold War developed in Europe. There were growing fears that any upheaval in Spain, or even any effort at the United Nations or elsewhere to discuss the Franco regime, would benefit the Soviet Union. While there was no fear of a Soviet invasion in Spain, when France and then Poland brought the issue to the United Nations in 1946, it was seen as a great propaganda victory for the Soviets, for it meant that the United States had to either agree with the Soviets that the Franco regime was an illegitimate vestige of Fascism or state that it was perfectly legal , which would put the United States clearly on the antidemocratic 163 Conclusion side of the ledger. Eventually the United States just had to admit that it accepted Franco. The most notable move in this direction was the adoption of a document prepared by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in October 1947 calling for a “normalization” of relations between the United States and Spain. The State Department document reflected the fact that Spain was seen by the United States less as a country that was home to spoiler Nazis and more in the context of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. While some policies against Franco remained in place, such as Spain’s exclusion from Marshall Plan aid, relations were gradually normalized . Soon after Marshall Plan aid was cut, the Truman government worked to facilitate private credit for Spain, and U.S. military planners began to explore the issue of military aid for Spain and the possibility of building U.S. military bases there. These bases were agreed to in an accord signed in 1953. As Angel Viñas has written, the “exigencies of Realpolitik” came to determine the direction of policy. The realism of 1945, characterized by a fear of Nazism, was replaced by that of 1947, with its sense of a clear Soviet threat in Europe. Another victim of the Cold War was the deep commitment to denazification. While U.S. authorities began to investigate rumors of escape routes for former SS members from Italy via Spain to Argentina in 1946, by 1947 they had decided to use them themselves. Once the war ended, U.S. intelligence was interested in interviewing any Nazi intelligence agents who had worked with anticommunist networks across Europe. By 1947 almost any former Nazi with anticommunist experience was eligible for a job with U.S. intelligence. Once these former Nazi intelligence agents were identified, U.S. intelligence used existing networks of movement, or “ratlines,” to help get people with whom they wanted to work out of hiding. Other U.S. agencies similarly recruited top German experts, especially in scienti fic fields. The most infamous of these were Wernher von Braun and other rocket scientists recruited under Operation Paperclip, but hundreds were actually recruited to serve in a Cold War capacity. Many other former Nazi intelligence agents, scientists, and technicians went to Argentina, a fact that the United States knew well but one Hunting Nazis in Franco’s Spain 164 that it overlooked during the early 1950s. In light of these efforts by the United States, the repatriation campaign in Spain...