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V. Consolidating Recent Gains
- Louisiana State University Press
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CHAPTER FIVE CONSOLIDATING RECENT GAINS do not, however, propose to pursue him far into Mississippi," Halleck said of the retreating Beauregard,1 and thereby established a pattern for six weeks of campaigning in the West. Rather than plan offensive action, he spent his time organizing the department, improving the health of his troops, repairing railroads and obtaining new cars. The relentless heat of the Mississippi summer was conducive to that attitude. Old Brains unobtrusively reverted to the defensive.He told Pope, who was pursuing Beauregard, to "Press the enemy as hard as you deem it safe and advisable," but warned him to watch for a surprise attack on his flanks; Halleck had done his part by deploying troops on those flanks. Pope interpreted his commander's words liberally and pushed Beauregard vigorously. He reported June 4 that the enemy had halted at Baldwyn,on the railroad line south of Corinth, and that he would attack in the morning "unless I am otherwise ordered." Halleck sped an answer that outlined for Pope the purpose of the pursuit. "The main object now is to get the enemy far enough south to relieve our railroads from danger of an immediate attack. I think by showing a bold front for a day or two the enemy will continue his retreat, which is all I desire. There is no object in bringing on a battle if this object can be obtained without one."2 It was a perfect summary of the i8th century Jominian concept of war. Knowing that Beauregard would shortly 1 O.R.,Set. I, X,Part i, p. 668. 2 Ibid., Part 2,p.252. T 56 HenryWager Halleck resume his retreat, doubting that Pope could defeat his army and satisfied to free the area of the enemy, Halleck restrained the general and prevented an unnecessary battle. A few days later Old Brains abandoned the pursuit. Then Halleck outlined his program. The army in Mississippi— the center of his line—would remain on the defensive, scattering over northern Mississippi and southern Tennessee to repair railroads and build fortifications. Curtis in Arkansas would continue his offensive and Buell would embark on an expedition into East Tennessee . Halleck himself would stay at Corinth, directing operations as he had from St. Louis. The dispersal of forces was in direct contradiction to Jomini's doctrine of concentration, but Halleck felt he had no real alternative. The huge area he had taken could not be held easily until railroad communications between strong points were improved. The intense heat and the sudden change in climate, food, and water made active campaigning nearly unendurable for northern soldiers experiencing their first southern summer. Halleck put them to repairing railroads and fortifying strong points. Even Buell's expedition was in part a railroad repairing operation. Concentration could come in the fall, after current gains had been consolidated . Knowing that Lincoln's concern for the Unionists in East Tennessee often clouded his judgment, Halleck hoped the War Department would approve his plans.8 Stanton and Lincoln approved, but not without reservations. "I suppose you contemplate the occupation of Vicksburg and clearing out the Mississippi to New Orleans," Stanton wired.4 Halleck may have been amused at the casualness of the question. He could have pointed out that taking Vicksburg and clearing the Mississippi would require time, more troops and more supplies, and therefore was not being contemplated at the present. However, he chose to ignore the question and concentrate on improving his position. To make Corinth secure, Halleck fanned out his troops. Buell 8 Ibid., Part i, p. 671. *lbid., 671. Stanton wanted Halleck to co-operate with Benjamin F. Butler, the armycommander at New Orleans. [34.237.75.165] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 09:29 GMT) Consolidating Recent Gains 57 was moving along the Memphis and Charleston railroad to the east, toward Chattanooga; Pope was repairing the Mobile and Ohio road south of Corinth; Sherman was proceeding west on the Memphis and Charleston. All forces were busily engaged in getting up locomotives and repairing track. Though Halleck's men may not have shared his zeal for railroad repair, they restored over three hundred miles of track. Other troops improved the fortifications which the Confederate engineers had erected around Corinth.5 Halleck knew that Washington solons wanted more offensive action from the army in the West; he also knew that the slightest promise of activity in pro-Unionist East Tennessee would dispel Lincoln's objections to nonaggressive activity in all other...