Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff

XIV. Total War

CHAPTER FOURTEEN TOTAL WAR transformation had taken place. It culminated when Sherman took Atlanta and deliberately and relentlessly destroyed it. The shackles of Eighteenth Century limited warfare had been broken. From his Washington headquarters Old Brains sent his highest approval. "We have tried three years of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation," Halleck told Sherman: "I would destroy every mill and factory within my reach which I did not want for my own use." Halleck approved taking or annihilating anything that could possibly be of service to the enemy. He sanctioned a type of warfare abhorrent to Jomini and balked only at burning private homes, which was "barbarous." * Just as Halleck's abilities had grown throughout the war, so too had his bitterness increased. The bombardment of Fort Sumter had torn him from a lucrative law practice, position and social prestige. He had discarded much of value to come to Washington, but with a reasonable degree of certainty he expected to gain greater prestige in the eyes of his country. After all, he had been the only American contributor to the lofty theoretical aspects of war. But rather than earning the country's great respect he received its derision. His sacrifices had been made in vain. Halleck progressively looked at the Southerners with increasing hatred. They, who had started the war, became the object of his vituperation. The new attitude both contributed to and made easier his transformadon into an advocate of 1 0.R., Set.I, XXXIX, Part 2, p. 503. A 18a Henry Wager Hatteck total war, a subject on which Sherman was about to hold introductory classes. By September, Sherman was well into the interior of Georgia with a huge veteran army and several courses of action open to him. After trying unsuccessfully to catch Hood's battered but intact army, Sherman showed no inclination to pursue the Confederate , maintaining he would never find Hood and that he could do more good on a raid of his own toward the Atlantic coast. Grant, who usually went after armies rather than places and saw little difference between the Eastern and Western theater, objected to any movement south until Hood was destroyed. Although Halleck agreed with Sherman, he thought the objective of his march should be the Gulf, rather than the Atlantic coast. All the courses presented various possibilities and drawbacks and all presented dimcult supply problems for Halleck. Grant, who would finally have to assume the responsibility for any decision, Halleck, who would handle the administrative work, and Sherman, who would execute the move, exchanged ideas before reaching a conclusion. On September 26 Halleck said the line for Sherman to follow was through Montgomery, which would open the Alabama River. This course would prevent Confederate raids into Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky,while depriving the Southerners of the grain, iron and coal of Northern Georgia, Alabama, and Mississsippi. Another advantage was that Hood's supplies would be cut and his raiding power limited.2 Sherman preferred to march to Savannah because it would cut off a larger slice of Confederate territory. On October i he telegraphed the General-in-chief and proposed sending Thomas and his corps back to Nashville while taking the rest of the army to Savannah, or Charleston, "breaking roads and doing irreparable damage." He would cut loose from supply lines and live off the countryside. Thomas could remain on the defense and restrain any serious damage Hood might do. Every proposed movement save one was based on Jomini's teach2 Ibid., 480. Total War 183 ings; Sherman would leave a strong base of operations in his rear, would operate on interior lines, would "fight battles" of manoeuvre rather than blood fests, would keep his army concentrated , and would aim at cities rather than the enemy army. He had only abandoned, as had Halleck, Jomini's implicit gentlemanly war that refrained from striking at civilians. And showing his appreciation for one of the cardinal tenets of war, Sherman concluded: "We cannot remain on the defensive."a Halleck sawthe telegram as it passed through Washington on the way to Grant's headquarters at City Point. Assuming his right to comment, he composed a lengthy letter to Grant the next day. He criticized the Jominian plan in Jominian terms. The Chief of staff carefully weighed the advantages of each alternative; a movement down the Alabama River, an advance to Mobile, a drive to Pensacola or a...