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11 third logos (1287b36 –1288a30) qualifying the universal king’s rule The third logos begins by addressing the criticism made against the pambasileia throughout the second logos. Aristotle notes that the arguments “hold in some cases, in others perhaps they do not” (3.17.1287b36). By “perhaps they do not,” he does not mean that they definitely do not hold in some cases. This qualification is important, because it leaves open the truthfulness of both arguments. Aristotle notes that certain people are by nature “apt for mastery, and . . . kingship, and . . . another [kind] that is political, and this is both just and advantageous” (3.17.1287b37–38). But no one, he says, is apt for tyranny or for the other deviant types of rule, because these types of rule are contrary to nature (3.17.1287b39–40). Nature is said to provide for the just and the advantageous, not for the unjust or the disadvantageous. But Aristotle here speaks “beautifully” concerning nature’s powers. As is seen by nature’s inability to make evident to the many the superior nature of the superior man, it is not clear to what extent nature directly provides for the just and advantageous , and not the unjust and the disadvantageous, to “come into being.” History shows us many examples of slavish multitudes who choose to be led by a tyrant (or despot) rather than to live freely. Also, when a free people reject law and moderation, in both character and in rule, they tend to embrace both license and lust. Such a free people will end up being as tyrannical as any tyrant. Both de Tocqueville and Publius, the author of The Federalist Papers, affirm this along with Aristotle, who warns that the disposition of a radical democracy is like that of tyranny and must be avoided (4.4.1292a10–20). Aristotle restates the argument of the laws, that among similar and equal persons it is neither advantageous nor just for one person to have authority over all matters, regardless of whether there are laws or not, and he acts as law himself, whether he and they are good or not, and even whether he is third logos 197 better in respect to excellence—unless it is in a certain manner. (3.17.1287b40–1288a5) If, in other words, people are basically equal, there is no reason except in possessing an excellence of a “certain manner” for one to have authority over all. The “manner” of excellence in question is that of an excellence that is so preeminent that all other excellences are seen as lacking in value. Only then is it acceptable for one individual to possess authority over all, even when the multitude in question is composed of equals basically similar in nature. Yet this claim points to the importance of the multitude’s character and nature, and one wonders why this type of rule is most fit for it. on the different natures of the multitudes The nature, or character, of the multitude to be ruled in many ways determines the type of regime that is best for it. There are as many forms of regimes that are best for a multitude as there multitudes (see Mulhern 1972). The best regime for a people depends upon their character. And the best for them may differ from what is best simply (see Rhodes 1991). Although Aristotle does not forget what is best for a given multitude, however, he insists upon finding out what is best simply. But the best simply must not overlook the limits placed upon the nature of human beings and thus forget their temporal and physical natures. Given these limitations, we turn to Aristotle’s account of the best multitude. Aristotle observes that there are fundamentally three characters of multitudes : kingly, aristocratic, and political. The kingly multitude is a multitude of such a sort that it accords with its nature to support a family that is preeminent in excellence relative to political leadership. (3.17.1288a9–11) The aristocratic multitude is of such a sort that it accords with its nature to support a multitude capable of being ruled in accordance with the rule that belongs to free persons whose excellence makes them expert leaders relative to political rule. (3.17.1288a12–14) The political multitude is one in which there arises in accordance with its nature a military multitude capable of ruling and being ruled in accordance with a law distributing offices on the basis...

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