In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

10 second logos (1287a1–b35) the pambasileia The second logos begins with the concern about a king who “acts in all things according to his own will” contrasted to a king who “rules according to law” (3.16.1287a1–4). Aristotle says that a monarchy that “rules according to law is not . . . a kind of kingship” (3.16.1287a4). He calls such a ruler a permanent general and notes that permanent generals can exist in all regimes (3.16.1287a5). The pambasileia rules in all matters only according to his own will (3.16.1287a8–9). This is a return to the beginning of the dialogue (3.16.1285b20–30), where Aristotle drops the discussion of the permanent general because it is not a type of regime. The return to the issue of a permanent general is a rejection of the king’s being subject to the law and hence a rejection of the rule of law. Again, that the regime is prior to the laws is a fundamental principle of Aristotelian political philosophy.1 The rejection of the king’s ruling by law is made within the context of Aristotle’s raising another criticism: “some hold that it is not even in accordance with nature for one person among all the citizens to have authority, where the city is constituted out of similar persons” (3.16.1287a10–13; see Kullmann 1984; Newell 1991, 201–6). That is, if the citizens are similar (or equal) persons, the rule by one seems to be contrary to justice: For in the case of persons similar by nature, justice and merit must necessarily be the same according to nature; and so if it is harmful for their bodies if unequal persons have equal sustenance and clothing, it is so also [for their souls if they are equal] in what pertains to honor, and similarly therefore if equal persons have what is unequal. (3.16.1287a12–16)2 1. See Vander Waerdt 1985, 249–51, who points out the difficulty of reconciling this concept of kingship with the overall argument of Aristotle’s political philosophy. 2. It should be noted that Algernon Sidney cites this and other passages to defend republican rule against the arguments made by Filmer concerning the divine right of kings, i.e., the absolute rule of kings. See Sidney 1990, 84–5. 184 aristotle’s “best regime” What is being argued is that equal persons should be treated in roughly the same manner, whereas unequal persons should be treated differently (see Rhodes 1991; Kullmann 1984; Voegelin 1990, 55–70). An example of this is that it would be unhealthy for a person of one constitution to eat an amount equal to what is consumed by a person with a radically different constitution. As to clothing, it is silly for a person who is big to wear clothes fit for a small person, and vice versa. This is a reflection on the teaching of the history of regimes. Since the history of regimes points to the equalization of human beings, political rule must then correspondingly represent the rule of equals. From this general premise, Aristotle concludes: Hence it is no more just [for equal persons] to rule than to be ruled, and it is therefore more just [that they rule and be ruled] by turns. (3.16.1287a16–17; compare Sidney 1990, 84–5) That persons have natures that are similar (to each other) would seem to require equals ruling and being ruled by each other in turn. The partisan of the laws notes, “this is already law; for the arrangement [of ruling and being ruled] is law” (3.16.1287a18). According to the above argument, it is preferable to have law rule rather than have only one citizen rule (3.16.1287a19–20). “If it is better that some must rule,” this argument says, then those who are ruling “must be established as guardians of the law and servant of the laws” (3.16.1287a20–21). The reason for establishing the offices under the law is that “there must necessarily exist certain offices [by which persons, and not law, rule]” (3.16.1287a22). The offices and officers who serve the laws are established to exercise authority for the laws in matters, as argued in the first logos, that the laws’ principles cannot cover (see Miller 1979). The prudence of the office holder is to make up for the defect of the laws; however...

Share