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120 f i v e Trials and Murders Different Interpretations of the Law Repression and the proper punishment of crimes are essential elements for the conservation of the people. —claudio martínez de pinillos, 1830 D uring the days that followed the uprising, the authorities, aided by the fervent support of the local residents, unleashed a wave of repressive measures that ranged from arrests to illegal summary executions . The large number of letters exchanged between the slave-hunting parties, local residents, officers in charge of the investigation, the governor of Matanzas, the officers at the Military Commission headquarters in Havana, and Captain General Vives himself are invaluable sources of information about the repression and court procedures against the rebel slaves. The documents produced by the colonial government and the Military Commission are the best sources for the study of the insurrection. Although colonial authorities were eager to downplay the historical significance of the event almost from the moment they began questioning the rebels, the thoughts, actions, and ideas of the latter were sketched sometimes in detail and other times only barely. Thus, the voices of the rebels, though filtered by the prosecutors, secretaries, and colonial officers, can be occasionally discerned . Sometimes, when their depositions were literally transcribed, making them accurate pieces of historical evidence, these voices are clear. Other times, when secretaries used predesigned formulae or transcribed what they thought was relevant and discarded the rest, the voices are more difficult to recognize. All in all, a thorough and systematic reading between the lines of every deposition while keeping the context in mind helps us understand what the words of these men and women, interrogated under very harsh conditions, possibly including torture, may have meant. The morning after the revolt was crushed, Manuel Castilla y Armenteros, Trials and Murders: Different Interpretations of the Law · 121 acting governor of Matanzas, ordered his officers to learn as much as possible about the leaders of the movement, their aims, any possible accomplices from outside the district, and any other matters relating to the disturbing episode. Castilla y Armenteros entrusted this mission to the old and experienced officer Félix de Acosta, who, accompanied by his secretary, Joaquín de la Fuente, immediately headed to Guamacaro and began interrogating anyone involved in the events of the previous day.1 His first witnesses were two slaves, Guillermo Congo, a slave on Guillermo Gowen’s coffee plantation, and San Gil, a slave belonging to Carlos Mansuit. On June 18, what until that moment had only constituted a thought became a near certainty that put the authorities in Matanzas and Havana on alert. During his interrogation San Gil, helped by two interpreters, declared that far from being spontaneous, the uprising had been carefully planned for at least a month before it broke out. As soon as San Gil revealed his knowledge of a premeditated plot, the governor of Matanzas, Cecilio Ayllón, who was once again in charge of the province, wrote an anxious letter to Captain General Vives highlighting his suspicions about the existence of “a combined plan with the colored people of this city, Havana, and buelta de abajo [sic] and that in order to carry it out they had been acquiring gunpowder and bullets for some time, taking advantage of the slaves that come and go from their estates to the towns and villages, buying and selling stuff.”2 Thus, Vives’s fears of an international conspiracy to snatch the island from the hands of Spain seemed to be justified. The captain general was so certain that something was going on beyond the coffee fields of Guamacaro that he let everyone know his thoughts about this possible plot. In a letter sent to the governor of Matanzas he confessed, “I have reason to believe that the movement is the work of our enemies, always tireless in their endeavors to bring ruin and destruction to this ever loyal island.”3 Until then Vives had been convinced that there was nothing to fear from the slaves living on the island. As we have seen, the first months of 1825 were a difficult period for the captain general, who had been continually on alert, expecting an imminent invasion from those he called his “enemies.” Just a month earlier he had written about the desires for independence among the Creole middle classes, while dismissing any idea of a serious menace to the stability of the island unless “a force of six to eight thousand men from abroad...

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