American Naval History, 1607-1865: Overcoming the Colonial Legacy

Preface

vii Although there have been many splendid books on early American naval history, there is a need for a new survey of the subject , particularly one with a broad perspective. This book tries to meet that need. It begins before 1775 because at least until the time of the Civil War American naval history was in- fluenced greatly by attitudes, practices, and conditions dating from American colonial history. It pays attention to other navies , particularly those of Britain and France, because American naval history is closely connected with British and French naval history. Although it can stand alone, it is intended as a companion volume to my book The Age of the Ship of the Line: The British and French Navies, 1650–1865 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009). Both books are concerned with the ways navies reflect diplomatic, political, economic, and social developments. Looking at American naval history from a wide perspective helps us to avoid reading the United States Navy’s twentieth -century triumphs back into previous centuries. Until the Civil War, America was a minor naval power. During its first two major wars, the War of American Independence and the Preface viii preface War of 1812, the American navy was virtually annihilated. It is true that the navy fought a number of successful combats against individual enemy ships and even won battles on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain during the War of 1812. On balance, however, the record of the American navy during the age of sail was not very impressive, particularly in comparison with the British navy, which twice virtually swept it from the sea. Given America’s enormous resources and growing population , its navy generally was undersized and poorly funded. Its participation in the Civil War of 1861–65 was very different. The navy suddenly expanded hugely and performed wonders against an extremely dangerous enemy. Although the navy then languished for a couple of decades, the foundations of American naval power had been established. Once America decided it wanted a modern navy, it was able to build one in fairly short order. In the twentieth century it became first a major naval power and then the world’s dominant naval power. Why did it take almost a century for the United States to build its first large navy? As I will argue, it was largely due to the continuation of traditions established in America’s colonial past, such as localism and sectionalism, an obsession with the frontier and territorial expansion, and an aversion to strong central government and taxation. By weakening the power of the states, expanding American industry, and strengthening the federal government, the Lincoln administration finally made possible America’s rise as a naval power. In writing this book I have benefited from the work of numerous fine historians, including my friends John Hattendorf , Bill Fowler, Thomas Schaeper, Denver Brunsman, and Jim Bradford; its mistakes are my own. I also wish all too belatedly to acknowledge the encouragement given to me by a ix preface model naval officer, Lieutenant Commander Jay Arnold, executive officer of the uss Duncan (ddr 874), aboard which I served in 1964–66. As with previous books I wish to thank my wonderful family, particularly my wife, Susan Kruger, and children, Veronica Lamka, Robert Dull, Max Kruger-Dull, and Anna Kruger-Dull. I dedicate this book to two history buffs, my nephews Peter and John Hamburger. American Naval History, 1607–1865 ...