Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox

7. "What Force the Enemy Have . . . I Have No Means of Judging Accurately"

Chapter 7 ‘‘What Force the Enemy Have . . . I Have No Means of Judging Accurately’’ After the fall of Vicksburg, Grant looked ahead to new challenges and toward ending the rebellion as quickly as possible. After solidifying the Union hold on the Mississippi Valley, Grant looked southeast toward Mobile, Alabama, as his next objective. Planning for that campaign ended abruptly, however, as events in Tennessee demanded his attention . In early July, Rosecrans had maneuvered Braxton Bragg’s army out of Middle Tennessee and sent it reeling toward Chattanooga. Forced to evacuate that railroad town, Bragg retreated into northern Georgia while Rosecrans claimed the ‘‘Gateway of the Confederacy.’’ On September 19–20, however, the Confederate Army of Tennessee, with help from Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s corps on loan from the Army of Northern Virginia, exacted revenge when it smashed Federal forces at Chickamauga and drove them back to Chattanooga. Occupying the heights overlooking the town, Bragg besieged Chattanooga and nearly severed the Army of the Cumberland’s supply lines. With food stockpiles dwindling and both men and animals on reduced rations, the army faced starvation unless help arrived soon. Described by Lincoln as acting ‘‘confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head,’’ Rosecrans appeared incapable of solving the logistical problem or dealing with Bragg. On October 18 Grant met Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in Louisville and accepted command of the newly created Military Division of the Mississippi , a vast geographic command comprised of the departments and armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. Grant replaced Rosecrans with Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and elevated William T. Sherman to head the Army of the Tennessee. And instead of only sending men and arms, Grant planned to direct the relief of Chattanooga in person. Not only did he hope to end the siege but he also foresaw an opportunity to accomplish much more. Atlanta, the biggest prize in the West, beckoned.1 Before reaching Chattanooga, Grant met with Rosecrans, and despite the animus between them dating back to the battle of Corinth, he recalled that his subordinate had made ‘‘some excellent suggestions’’ as to the next course of action. Apparently, however, Rosecrans failed to share the latest intelligence on the enemy. A few days after the meeting, Grant complained that he still knew little about the forces ringing Chat177 tanooga. His only information came from deserters, whose knowledge was ‘‘limited to their own brigades or Divisions at furthest.’’ This problem appears strange given the emphasis Rosecrans’ had always placed on intelligence procurement. He had committed tremendous time, energy, and resources in creating an effective network. Rosecrans laid the foundation for Grenville Dodge’s organization in Corinth, and in Nashville he had established the so-called Army Police, a comprehensive intelligence outfit under Col. William Truesdail, whose duties included information collection, counterintelligence, and investigations of disloyalty in the city. The information gathered by this organization, as well as from a myriad of other sources, formed the basis of Rosecrans’ brilliant deception of Bragg during the Tullahoma campaign. Just two weeks before briefing Grant, Rosecrans’ intelligence had also formulated an order of battle for the Army of Tennessee, which was fairly accurate and provided an estimate (although highly inflated) of its strength. Apparently, Grant never received such details.2 Rosecrans’ reticence led Grant to complain, ‘‘What force the enemy have . . . I have no means of judging accurately.’’ Their recent movements also remained a mystery. ‘‘[F]or the last few days there seems to have been some moving of troops,’’ he observed, ‘‘But where to I cannot tell.’’ Without Dodge, who was still in Corinth and would soon be employed rebuilding the rail system between Nashville and Chattanooga, Grant was on his own.3 Having survived a harrowing journey over Walden’s Ridge, traversing the same roads used to move supplies into Chattanooga, the new commander arrived on October 23, 1863. His recent passage left little doubt of the need for a more reliable means of supplying Thomas’s army. After witnessing firsthand the ragged and starving condition of the Army of the Cumberland, Grant worked to relieve the suffering in preparation for commencing offensive operations. As one officer noted at that time, the army had but three options: ‘‘open the river, retreat, or starve.’’ But Grant refused to abandon the town or to let his men starve. ‘‘Since Vicksburg fell this has become really the vital point of...