Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox

6. "I Have Reliable Information from the Entire Interior of the South"

Chapter 6 ‘‘I Have Reliable Information from the Entire Interior of the South’’ Following the Holly Springs and Chickasaw Bluffs disasters, Grant determined the Mississippi River would be the axis of advance for his next attempt at Vicksburg. This avenue promised to reduce reliance upon overland logistical lines that presented easy targets for mounted raiders who, as Van Dorn demonstrated, were difficult to track in hostile territory . But this new campaign posed significant challenges of its own, especially with regard to intelligence procurement. Part of his campaign preparation focused on finding the best avenue of approach once ashore. Sherman’s experience in January had revealed the difficulty of overcoming the Confederate defenses northeast of the city. Vicksburg’s river defenses consisted of powerful batteries perched along the steep hills running northeast to Haynes’ Bluff and southward past the town to Warrenton. To sail past these defenses, Federal vessels had to first negotiate a hairpin curve, all the while under fire from the river batteries, then run a gauntlet of shot and shell for several miles. Vicksburg’s guns also commanded the opposite bank and could blast attempts to cross the river or harass troop movements on the Louisiana shore. Enhanced by rugged terrain east of town, the land defenses added to the stout nature of the position, which was described as ‘‘frightful’’ by one observer. With over twenty thousand troops (a number that would grow with time) manning this fortress, Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton seemed poised to dash Union hopes of gaining control of the Mississippi. During the next few months of 1863, finding a way to crack these defenses and capture Vicksburg became Grant’s primary goal.1 From January through March, he explored several different ways to turn the Confederate position and avoid the teeth of their defenses. ‘‘The problem,’’ Grant wrote later, ‘‘was to secure a foothold upon dry ground on the east side of the river.’’ But this proved to be an onerous task. Grant experimented with several different water routes, including carving his own canals and using Lake Providence, Yazoo Pass, or Steele’s Bayou to circumvent Pemberton’s defenses. None of these enterprises bore much fruit. Another option was to march his forces down the Louisiana side to a suitable crossing place below Vicksburg. But aboveaverage water levels on the west bank delayed that operation. By April 1, however, the roads had improved and Grant scrapped the other projects 141 in favor of marching the Army of the Tennessee to a point midway between Warrenton and Grand Gulf and ferrying it across the river. Once on the other side, he could turn north toward Warrenton and Vicksburg or head south to aid Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks in his effort to capture Port Hudson. Regardless of which way he turned, Grant believed that once he crossed the Mississippi, Vicksburg was doomed.2 Intelligence on Vicksburg and its defenders would undoubtedly be a valuable asset in making decisions about where to cross and in identifying the position’s strengths and weaknesses. Finding information from the Mississippi side proved difficult, and much of what arrived at Grant’s headquarters at Young’s Point, Louisiana, only muddied already murky water. By late February, many rumors predicted that Pemberton planned to hold Vicksburg at all costs, but other reports claimed that the Confederates would evacuate the city without a fight. To confuse matters even more, other sources suggested that the Confederates hoped the Federals would land below Vicksburg and leave West Tennessee open to invasion. These contradictory reports and the difficulty in verifying them led to frustration. ‘‘It is impossible to get information from [Vicksburg],’’ Grant complained. ‘‘Even deserters who come can tell nothing except of their own regiments or Brigade at furthest.’’ A month later, he still grumbled that he possessed ‘‘no means of learning anything from below except what is occationally learned through Southern papers.’’ As a result , wrote Charles A. Dana, a War Department official attached to Grant’s staff, ‘‘This is not so well informed a place as I hoped to find it.’’3 Several reasons account for the dearth of reliable intelligence at Young’s Point. First, Grant had reduced his commitments in West Tennessee , stripped the region of available Union troops, and left the defense of the department primarily to Maj. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut in Memphis . Since Corinth was under Hurlbut’s command, Grenville Dodge reported to Charles S...