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9. Beyond Captivity: The Wars of 1812
- Johns Hopkins University Press
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c h a p t e r n i n e Beyond Captivity The Wars of 1812 On June 1, 1812, President James Madison asked Congress to declare war against Great Britain for committing “a series of acts hostile to the United States as an independent and neutral nation.” The United States, he concluded, must oppose “force to force in defense of their national rights.” Thus began the War of 1812, frequently referred to as a second war for American independence.1 Although Madison’s declaration and the ongoing conflict between the United States and Britain over neutral shipping rights might appear to have little relation to captivity generally or Barbary specifically, both played their parts in the coming of the War of 1812. In turn, the war itself prompted a final Barbary captivity crisis and a second Barbary war that could not be resolved until the United States and Great Britain reached a peace settlement in 1815. Just as the War of 1812 prompted Americans to revisit and ultimately resolve longstanding issues in the AngloAmerican relationship, this second war of 1812 did the same for the American– North African relationship, offering a chance to assert U.S. strength and competence and to exhibit America’s readiness to tame “barbarians” in the old world as well as the new. Finally, after this other war of 1812 was resolved, Americans could proclaim themselves fully independent of Britain and Barbary. The causes of the war with Britain have long puzzled historians. They have debated whether events in the West—Indian aggression supposedly incited by the British—or events in the Atlantic—British maritime depredations—were more important. They have also wondered about the trigger for the war: If naval and Indian depredations were continuing issues, what had changed by 1812? Answers to these questions become more apparent if one takes a larger view of 188 Captivity and the American Empire the conflict, going back at least eighteen years to 1794, when the new nation faced a similar set of circumstances. Americans had suffered from Indian attacks on the western frontier, which the public blamed on the inflammatory rhetoric of a British official.2 At the same time, the British had captured a number of American ships in the West Indies and continued to impress American sailors, while, in the Mediterranean, Algerians had captured eleven American ships, provoking the second phase of the Algerian crisis. In 1794 Americans viewed all of these events as part of the same fabric. The warp and woof were captivity and British culpability, with the latter emphasized more by Republicans than Federalists. The conspiratorial mind-set was perhaps most evident at a series of Republican influenced public meetings held in early 1794.3 Philadelphians condemned Britain for insulting American dignity by, among other things, “foment[ing] and maintain[ing] a savage war upon the frontiers of the United States . . . insidiously let[ting] loose the barbarians of Africa to plunder and enslave the citizens of the United States, . . . arrogantly attempt[ing] to prescribe boundaries to the American commerce . . . [and] basely authoriz[ing] piratical depredations to be committed by her own subjects on the ships and citizens of the United States.”4 The last point, referring to British capture of American ships and impressment of sailors, was critical. The notion of captivity was what linked all these injustices. The British and the Algerian pirates captured ships and sailors. With some cause, many Americans viewed the British as responsible for recent Indian attacks in the Northwest.5 Tying together the Algerian captures and West Indian captures, a group of Baltimore sailors declared, “It appears to be believed by all, that the same nation which insults us in the West Indies, has been instrumental in letting loose those barbarians.” Although many called for war, conflict with Britain at a time when the United States had no navy would have been disastrous. Instead, Americans relied on diplomacy, which resulted in Jay’s Treaty of 1795.6 Tellingly, early reports of that treaty erroneously suggested that it would lead to the release of the Algerian captives.7 Despite Jay’s efforts, impressment remained a hot-button issue, becoming far more significant as the United States found itself a vulnerable neutral carrier during the Napoleonic Wars. Britain impressed roughly nine thousand American seamen between 1793 and 1812, and France captured a smaller number.8 One writer, at least, blamed European jealousy of American commerce for both impressment and Barbary piracy, accusing the European powers of...