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77 Since the war ended in 1997, Tajikistan’s central government has struggled to establish its monopoly over organized violence. Throughout the republic, criminal gangs engaged in drug smuggling, political rivals of President Rakhmon posed threats of a coup d’etat, Islamist groups exploited links to Afghanistan, and former civil war commanders staged insurgencies, kidnapped international aid workers, and assassinated state officials. Tajikistan’s extremely weak postwar state has led some observers to forecast precipitous decline if not imminent failure. As one report concluded, “The Rakhmon regime could, theoretically speaking, collapse at any moment. This is because the institutional structures which usually support any political regime are missing in the case of Tajikistan.”1 Others have noted that, amidst a chaotic postwar environment and foundering institutions, Tajikistan’s government has gradually reasserted political control and extended social stability .2 Neitherof theseoutcomes,however,adequatelydescribesTajikistan’semerging state. While Tajikistan is still not consolidated around a single political authority, it is no longer mired in intrastate conflict and disorder. As this chapter shows, Tajikistan has emerged as an internally divided, fractious state in which resources and patronage have continued to produce starkly different rent-seeking opportunities to local elites. Initially, the formula for stabilizing and ruling Tajikistan after civil war entailed ceding control over state security institutions to key personalities (table 4.1) and nominally absorbing smaller militia forces into various ministries of the national government.3 Over time, however, Tajikistan’s fractious state apparatus has remained dependent on the co-optation of elites in some areas and locked in conflict with disaffected elites and nonstate militia forces in others. 4 TAJIKISTAN’S FRACTIOUS STATE 78 VERSO RUNNING HEAD 78 CHAPTER 4 Over the 1990s and early 2000s, the regime established political and social stability, but the postwar state did not see the rapid return of a consolidated security infrastructure. The regime confronted threats of insurgency, political intrigue within its ruling circles, and unruly commanders with its fragmented state security apparatus. In many parts of the country the center had little, if any, authority. How, then, did postwar stability emerge in Tajikistan at a time when the state faced severe internal threats and lacked a monopoly over the use of violence? Mary Kaldor has argued that a cohesive state security apparatus is indispensable for an effective state and the “fragmentation of the instruments of physical coercion” will lead to “the failure to sustain physical control over the territory and to command popular allegiance, [and will] reduce the ability to collect taxes and greatly weaken the revenue base of the state.”4 Yet a relatively stable Tajikistan remains in place. Several explanations have been put forward to account for Tajikistan’s postwar political recovery. One account claims that stability is due to an outsourcing of security functions to Russia.5 There is some evidence to support this. Russia has stationed a battalion of infantry troops in southern Tajikistan since the early 1900s, its border troops patrol Tajikistan’s 860-mile border with Afghanistan (until 2005),and its leadership has closely advised the Rakhmon government (especially in the immediate postwar years). In the late 1990s, Russia’s presence and political backing of the Rakhmon regime no doubt helped establish a baseline of stability in the country and prevented a recurrence of civil war. The long-term influence of Russia as an external guarantor of stability, however, is less important , and it remains difficult to assess how much of its influence extends down to the local level in Tajikistan. Another explanation attributes postwar stability to an effective“broker”—in this case, President Rakhmon—who has mediated conflicts between regional and clan divisions.6 As stipulated in the 1997 peace agreement, Rakhmon initially appointed opposition leaders to 30 percent of the country’s national positions . At the same time, he has used resource allocations and patronage to reward supporters and has used coercion to punish opponents among former commanders from both sides of the civil war. But developments since 2000 cast doubt on Rakhmon as a broker, since he has gradually pushed out opposition elites from his government and has kept “power ministries” related to state security under his relatives or close associates. The Rakhmon government ’s postwar record suggests it views the role of a “broker” as a temporary measure—a necessary but intermediate means of incorporating opposing elites into its governing structures until they can be brought up on charges or otherwise eliminated. They are then replaced by appointees who are personally loyal to the...

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