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209 Conclusion The title of this book, Defining Boundaries in al-Andalus, refers to the idea of definitive boundaries between Muslims and Christians and Jews—an idea rooted in the Qur’anic history of humankind and the sunna of the Prophet, embodied in Islamic law, and expressed in signs and acts integral to Islamic culture. The title also, more essentially, refers to the process of defining boundaries, boundaries that were mutable and negotiated at the margins of what distinguished “us” from “them” in a recursive engagement with social and cultural change. The focus of the book on law as a boundary-making mechanism offers a circumscribed view of a process of differentiation of the Muslim community from the communities of Christians and Jews who lived under the same ruler in a common physical environment and social space, and of a mode of engagement. In principle, Islamic law applied only to Muslims; in practice, the law extended to dhimmis (“protected persons”) in Dar al-Islam and even harbis (individuals from the Domain of War) to the extent that Muslims interacted with and had relationships with them. In ninth- and tenth-century al-Andalus Muslims interacted with dhimmis in a variety of social contexts: official, transactional, and personal. The structure of Umayyad rule is the first context for investigating legal boundary making. Relationships among individual rulers, judges, and jurists—the politics of the shura (council of jurisconsults)—informed legal opinions and decisions. The biographies of the fuqaha (jurists) personify how legal opinions and decisions were made discursively. A close-up view of some of the rivalries among fuqaha’ in the middle of the ninth century and of the ways by which consensus was achieved provides insight into an early stage in the emergence of the Maliki madhhab, or school of law, in al-Andalus. In the late ninth century and the tenth century jurists who were descendants and students of those prominent in the middle of the ninth century developed the madhhab further. Some fuqaha’ in this period (and later) proved more interested than others in assimilating hadith transmissions and principles of criticism and interpretation associated with usul 210 CONCLUSION al-fiqh (the sources of jurisprudence) with a rationalizing approach to the ra’y (legal opinion) of Malik. Unfortunately, it is difficult to locate specific legal opinions in specific political and social contexts. With rare exceptions, one is forced to look for correspondences between opinions and circumstances, and this is especially true for the opinions in the masail (legal questions and opinions; s. mas’ala). Nonetheless, correspondences between opinions having to do with interfaith marriage and conversion and the evidence of the martyrologies, for example, are compelling and a basis for grounding legal casuistry in social life. Chapter 2, “Society in Transition,” is dedicated to developing these correspondences and to the portrayal of a society undergoing dramatic social differentiation and cultural transformation. Chapter 3, “Between Enemies and Friends,” discusses how fuqaha’ negotiated the nexus between social roles and legal obligations between Muslims and dhimmis and demonstrates how casuistry allowed for accommodation. The discussion of the “border” in Chapter 4 provides another view of dhimmis. Dhimmis were within the bounds of the political community defined by the ruler and, in contrast to harbis, were protected by Islamic law. Jurists’ commitment to the concept of dhimma (protection) is thrown into relief in this context. Investigation of the distinction between dhimmi and harbi as another tested and negotiated boundary underscores the importance of historical context for understanding the legal status of dhimmis. Evidence discussed in all the chapters and the cumulative analysis of boundary making allow us to develop an understanding of the legal status of Christians and Jews in al-Andalus from the perspective of ninth- and tenthcentury Maliki fuqaha’. Jurists addressed the subject on three levels: constitutional , categorical, and associational. The constitutional understanding of legal status was the most abstract: the imagined social contract of the ahd al-dhimma or “pact of protection” defined the legal relationship between the ruler and his non-Muslim subjects and allowed for the practice of day-today intercommunal living. The definition of the category of ahl al-dhimma (people of the [pact of ] protection) constituted the meaningful legal boundary . Jurists determined that laws did not apply uniformly to all individuals and constructed legal categories to structure interpretation and practice. Rules of inheritance, for example, based on Qur’anic principles, applied differently to men and women. Men...

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