In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

83 With the prescribed articulation between language and speech (langue et parole),we enter a more clearly theologico-political space. The term “theologico-political” merits clarification. It is taken from Spinoza’s 1670 Tractatus theologico-politicus, written in Latin. This text aimed to establish the possibility of a philosophy that would be indentured neither to religion nor to secular power. The final chapter of Spinoza’s work affirms the possibility for “everyone” to publish “what he thinks.” “Speaking” is “licit” (dicere licere, the chapter title affirms), desirable even, from the point of view of priests and princes. These two perspectives are considered in sequence, in the order of demonstration, which might explain certain older translations in the vernacular languages, which disregarded the audacious adjective Spinoza uses. In addition, the Tractatus does not take the pairing of or the slippage between theology and politics as its primary focus. This does not keep the collusion between the two from being designated in the preface, which condemns the apotheosis of kings. This idea is already quite present in the description of the “transfer” of sovereignty from the Hebrew nation to God after the Exodus.1 I do not intend here to initiate a new interpretation of Spinoza. Rather, I invoke his ideas in order to make use of the argument. We know that “metaphysics” was not a substantive for Aristotle, but rather a descriptive designation (this is the book following the Physics—in Greek, meta ta Physika). The new concept of “metaphysics”does not constitute a betrayal Chapter 4 The Languages of Empire 84 GIVING LANGUAGES, TAKING SPEECH of Aristotle, only a reprise of his doctrine with a different meaning. The same thing is happening here: after so many others, I consider the existence of a theologico-political domain. The fact that this intersection is marked by a Spinozan term is not irrelevant:2 the field of study—the legitimacy of speech—is precisely what is at stake. Political theology is in any case induced, at one moment or another, by the phrase that convokes ecstasies, possessions, and spiritualism in the colony. The reprise of others’words did not,in principle,prevent the effectiveness of poetic speech. Allow me also to requalify one last time our objective here:we will explore theologico-political programming against indigenous speech,and through language (contre la parole indigène et par la langue). This is why the second colonial empire and its aftermath will serve as our primary terrain. It is not because the ancien régime had in some way privileged the expression of slaves. At the same time, however, language simply did not play the role that we have started to examine. Censure was exercised in another way, which I will have to approach using broad strokes. The Polyglot Mission Separating souls from enslaved bodies, the Code noir does not even mention the possibility that the slave might speak. The prohibition is general. The only misdeeds of the noirs are located in the blows they might inflict, assault and battery, theft, and escape (arts. 33, 34, 35, and 36, 38, respectively). Freed slaves, for their part, are expected to pay special respect to their former masters and their direct descendants. Slander will be punished according to the aggravating circumstances (art. 58). In ancient law, slander (l’injure) could be either physical or verbal. The capacity of a word to inflict harm on its own is thus not introduced until the point where,slavery having ended,the soul is legally reintegrated into the formerly possessed body. The royal edict annihilates the spoken word by means of the performative range of its own wording (langage);the annulment,however,is not performed specifically by the French language (la langue française). The legal text is intended to be put into effect, no matter what language translates it. As for slander, it would be recognized independently of the speech that would constitute slander. The ancien régime readily tolerated a de facto multilingualism in the heart of the kingdom. Language is not the basis of identity. The celebrated VillersCotter êts ordinance (1539) mentions the “langage maternel françois”in only one article (art. 111).3 The supposed reason for this has to do with the difficulty of “interpretation” (art. 110) and lawyers’ poor “understanding of Latin words” (art. 111). So, the opacity of an ancient language justifies the THE LANGUAGES OF EMPIRE 85 imposition of French. As with Joachim du Bellay’s La deffence et illustration de la langue...

Share