By Force and Fear: Taking and Breaking Monastic Vows in Early Modern Europe

5. Contracts and Fear in Monachization and Marriage

130  Chapter 5 Contracts and Fear in Monachization and Marriage Many young people forced into convents and monasteries would strongly have preferred to remain in “the world” and wed. Some of them—most strikingly,the Savoyard Marianne Williel,whom we will encounter shortly—had already exchanged promises of marriage with their loved ones when shifting parental strategies thwarted their plans. Although cause papers do not record their saying so explicitly, they must have envied full,half,and step siblings selected by their parents for marriage. The pill they had to swallow became even more bitter when a “favored” sibling taunted them. Recall the glee expressed by Francesco Gagnoni, an eldest son whose prospective inheritance was about to be fattened once again by his sister Maria Vittoria’s involuntary monachization, about her impending vestition. The modern assumption that young people destined for marriage were favored and those impelled into monastic life were disfavored is highly anachronistic. In the early modern era, elders on all social levels arranged marriages as well as monachizations,often without regard to their offspring’s inclination or disinclination toward potential partners. Both before and after a marriage had been solemnized, someone paired involuntarily with a mate who was physically unattractive or handicapped, much older or younger, of unequal social status,uncongenial (ill-tempered,violent,spendthrift,inclined to one or more types of vice), or some combination thereof might pursue CONTRACTS AND FEAR IN MONACHIZATION AND MARRIAGE 131 legal means of escape in an ecclesiastical court.1 To cite just one piquant Italian example from 1772, Maria Diana Viano, daughter of a wine merchant, resisted strong pressure to marry emanating from her father and his employee Biagio Macera, the spouse chosen for her, on the ground that the prospective groom was “short, dark-complexioned, and ugly.” In the vicar general’s court of Livorno, she contested Biagio’s claim that they had exchanged valid promises of marriage and won her case.2 As suggested earlier, two closely related legal and theological concepts pertained both to monastic profession and to marriage. First,both were considered to be contractual arrangements. The frequently reiterated, deceptively simple principle of the contract concealed many ambiguities. What, for instance, was the difference between a valid contract and an invalid one? Could an initially imperfect contract be perfected at a later date by words or deeds that explicitly or implicitly ratified it? Then there was that protean concept, “fear” (metus). What forms did it assume? How severe did it have to be to invalidate monastic profession or marriage? Did it have a different impact on strong-minded and timid subjects, mature adults and adolescents, men and women? What constituted solid evidence that it had been induced? In the case of monastic vows, with which we are mainly concerned, if it persisted for more than five years after religious had reluctantly professed, were they justified in approaching the pope for legal relief once it had finally ceased? How soon thereafter must they present their petitions? Monastic Profession as a Contract: Giuseppe Calisto, Francesco Spadaro, Marianne Williel Among the principles invoked by attorneys in cases of forced monachization and marriage, one of the most important was the contract, a concept rooted in Roman law.3 In the ceremony of profession, canonists and moral theologians unanimously maintained, a young person entering religious life (the party of the first part) made a contract with the order or house (the party of the second part).4 Both parties, one an individual and the other a corporate 1. Particularly in the past fifteen years, the study of matrimonial litigation in early modern ecclesiastical courts has become a growth industry. On proceedings in Italian courts,see four volumes of essays edited by Silvana Seidel Menchi and Diego Quaglioni: Coniugi nemici, Matrimoni in dubbio, Trasgressioni, and I tribunali matrimoni. 2. La Rocca; quotation at 546. 3. On various types of contracts in Roman law, see Berger, 413–14, “Contractus.” 4. Vows, of course, were also promises to God, but one-sided and unconditional ones. Jombart. Since God did not obligate himself to the professand, the relationship between them lacked the conditional character of a contract: “if I . . ., then you . . .” Hence promises to God played no part in attorneys’ briefs and SCC decisions. 132 BY FORCE AND FEAR group,had to be acting voluntarily and with full knowledge of the situation.5 If either the professand’s pronouncing vows, the monastic house...