In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

A central motivation of the United States in its  invasion of Iraq was to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein and fundamentally change the domestic political institutions and political culture of an oil-rich Middle Eastern country. Proponents of the campaign argued that American military power could and should be wielded in order to promote democratization, speculating that a “free” Iraq would serve as an important model of political transformation for the surrounding region. Summarizing this view, on November , , United States President George W. Bush declared that American foreign policy, as embodied by events in Iraq, had adopted a “forward strategy for freedom.”1 Although the overall military and strategic goals of the Iraq campaign were relatively clear (if controversial), the mechanisms through which the reconstruction and transformation of Iraq took place were not. Politicians and analysts of various political leanings criticized the American occupation of – as disorganized, piecemeal, and lacking an overall strategy. The initial decision by the Pentagon-appointed Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to disband the old Baathist-operated institutions of the Iraqi state, most notably the Iraqi military, clashed with the practical requirements of stabilizing the country and establishing political order. The original plan to convene a national convention to draft a new Iraqi Constitution was postponed when it became clear                                                        . Dana Milbank and Mike Allen, “Bush Urges Commitment to Transform Mideast,” Washington Post, November , , A. that Iraq’s ethnic and religious differences, not new political parties or Western political ideologies, endured as the basis for political affiliation. Dozens of American companies were assigned major reconstruction contracts amidst criticisms of noncompetitive bidding, cronyism and overcharging , but their overall project coordination was mismanaged and their exact relationship with the interim ministries and government agencies remained ill-defined. Throughout all of these political difficulties , the security situation in pockets of the country destabilized to the point where a permanent insurgency, not Coalition forces, controlled several cities. As the American occupation revealed, successful reconstruction was a far more challenging task than most policymakers had anticipated before the start of the military campaign. From a historical perspective, the optimistic prewar assumptions of U.S. policymakers about governing Iraq were hardly atypical. Rulers of expanding states, empires, and military occupations consistently have assumed that the mere imposition of hierarchical rule would allow them to transform a periphery’s domestic institutions according to their national values, ideologies, and preferences. Such ambitious plans to enact dramatic and fundamental change were often compromised by the practical realities of governance. Whether we look at imperial Japan’s attempt to transform Manchuria (Manchukuo) into a neighboring utopia, Soviet efforts to transform the very social fabric and identities of its Eurasian satellites, France’s campaign to impose its civilizing values in Western Africa, or current American efforts to promote its supposedly more enlightened and progressive form of empire at the beginning of the twenty-first century, successful instances of institutional transformation have been rare. Although such organizational issues often lie at the heart of understanding the political governance of states, empires, and occupations, we rarely address them as objects of analysis or formulate empirical investigations around them. Scholars of empire and hierarchy, much like policymakers , often place excessive emphasis on the ideology or identity of a particular polity and ignore the common organizational issues and dilemmas that confront all hierarchical polities. What types of hierarchical organization are more likely to promote institutional change in a periphery, and what types will entrench preexisting political and social structures? What kinds of institutions do various types of hierarchical rule and governance mechanisms create within a periphery? When will actors entrusted with formal governing authority complete the tasks they are assigned as opposed to acting opportunistically in their own selfinterest or colluding with peripheral actors? In short, how can we better     understand the causal effects of hierarchical organization on the institutional formation and development of governed polities? A L  M S: T I  O F Political analysts rarely address questions about hierarchical organization , yet these same issues are the explicit focus of management scholars concerned with understanding the organizational properties and trade-offs associated with various types of economic organization. Management scholars examine the mechanisms and incentive structures through which hierarchical governance within corporations is exercised and the powerful causal effects they exert. Variation in the organization of firms accounts for important differences in firm behavior as well as the behavior of individual actors within them. Perhaps the most widely recounted anecdote about the importance of corporate organization is the comparison of...

Share