An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy

15. SUPPORT TEAMS AND THE ROAD AHEAD

154 15 SUPPORT TEAMS AND THE ROAD AHEAD The “predispositions” of the three major players at Camp David, suggests Harold Saunders, then the assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asia Affairs, were crucial to the success of the Camp David meetings:“Sadat was a visionary; Carter, the engineer; and Begin, the lawyer.”1 Jimmy Carter was, as we have seen, at his peak at Camp David. He was tenacious, well-informed, and flexible. He also encouraged and listened to other points of view before making decisions.2 “The presidential aides,” as Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan later noted,“showed both respect and genuine affection for Carter.And his own attitude toward them—at times to members of our own delegation—was one of companionship . Neither in word nor behavior was he ever pretentious or supercilious.”3 In Anwar el-Sadat, Carter had a genuine partner in peace. The Egyptian president was intuitive, imaginative, and committed to the big picture rather than the grinding details. Carter noted Sadat’s flexibility on several occasions, telling his advisors that Sadat was always willing to accommodate him when called upon;4 he also felt at ease with him. Sadat, in turn, was “mesmerized” by President Carter and counted on the president’s personal involvement in the future to make agreements work.5 MenachimBegincreatedmoreproblemsforCarter.TheCentralIntelligenceAgency (CIA) profile of Israeli Prime Minister Begin enabled Carter to understand some of his sensitivities in terms of his difficult history.6 Still, Begin often tried Carter’s patience. Shortly after the conference opened, Carter saw Begin as unimaginative and too preoccupiedwithlegalismsandtheexactmeaningof words.7 Indeed,onthenightof theirfirst meeting, Carter told his wife, Rosalynn,“I don’t believe he has any intention of going through with a peace treaty.”8 On Sunday, September 10, Carter told Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan that he considered the prime minister to be“unreasonable and an obstacle to peace.”9 The next day, when Begin refused to accept language in the U.S. proposal that had been accepted by Israel in United Nations Resolution 242, the president exploded:“If you won’t accept past agreements, then we’re wasting our time here....It’s time to go home. It was a mistake to have called you here in the first place.”10 Members of the Israeli delegation came to the rescue.Moshe Dayan,EzerWeizman, Aharon Barak, and General Avraham Tamir were much more effective in changing Begin’s mind than Carter could be.11 Dayan,according to Saunders,was the most active of the delegation at Camp David, talking to people and passing notes around the table. Barak, Israel’s attorney general, was also very helpful, explaining in legal terms how an agreement could be reached. This was in contrast with Weizman, who would lean back, cross his hands, and look at the ceiling whenever a difficult point was reached.12 SUPPORT TEAMS AND THE ROAD AHEAD 155 FIGURE 10. Menachim Begin (left), Jimmy Carter (middle), and Anwar Sadat (right) at Camp David. Photograph courtesy of the Jimmy Carter Library. FIGURE 11. Anwar Sadat, Jimmy Carter, and Menachim Begin outside at Camp David. Photograph courtesy of the Jimmy Carter Library. 156 MIDTERM ACHIEVEMENTS These men even gave strategic advice to theAmericans.The decision on September 7 to suspend direct talks between Begin and Sadat was prompted by the suggestions of one Israeli that the tripartite talks were only making Begin more rigid. It would be better , he suggested, for the Americans to pay more attention to Dayan and Weizman.13 The U.S. decision to put off the issue of Israeli settlements in the Sinai Peninsula until the end of the meetings was a response to a warning from Dayan and Weizman. Begin was rigid on the matter and believed it should be postponed until the other issues could be resolved.14 General Tamir’s decision on September 12 to circumvent Begin and call General Ariel Sharon opened up the possibility that Sharon and other right-wing members of Begin’s cabinet might accept a possible compromise on the Sinai settlements.15 In securing from U.S.Defense Secretary Harold Brown the pledge that the United States would help rebuild the Israeli airfields to be dismantled in the Sinai,Weizman contributed to the resolution of another sticking point that could have ruined the talks. And Dayan’s suggestion that the whole Sinai issue could be referred to a vote in the...