An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy

7. COMPETITION IN THE HORNOF AFRICA

77 7 COMPETITION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA “There is an overwhelming cooperation and compatibility between Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski, Harold Brown...and others who help me shape foreign policy,” Jimmy Carter declared at a Texas civic luncheon in Fort Worth on June 23, 1978.1 Three days later Carter underscored this message in a meeting at the National Press Club: “I think it’s easy for someone who disagrees with a decision that I make to single out Dr. Brzezinski as a target, insinuating that I’m either ineffective or incompetent or ignorant, that I don’t actually make the decision....And it gives an easy target for them without attacking the President of the United States....But I’ve noticed that President Brezhnev, Mr. Castro and others always single out Dr. Brzezinski as their target. It’s not fair to him.”2 Carter was responding to charges of conflicts between his advisors—not from Moscow or Havana but from Washington, D.C. On June 8, fourteen members of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee had sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance a letter, asking him to clear up “confusion and doubt” as to U.S. policies with respect to several crucial areas “such as Soviet-American relations and Africa.”3 At issue was theAmerican response to Soviet involvement in Somalia and Ethiopia, two Marxist regimes strategically placed in the shipping lanes for Middle East oil. Somalia bordered the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. Its neighbor Ethiopia, a landlocked kingdom throughout much of its history, had gained geopolitical significance because of the ports on the Red Sea it had acquired in 1962 when Eritrea was made an integral part of the country. In Somalia, Mohammed Siad Barre, who had been in control of the government since 1969, joined the Arab League and forged strong ties with the Soviet Union.In Ethiopia,Colonel Mengistu Halle Mariam took over the government in 1977, cut back that country’s ties to the United States, and sought Soviet support. For a while the Soviet Union tried to support both these leftist governments. But in late summer 1977, Somalia sent troops into the Ogaden region, recognized by most other African nations as a part of Ethiopia. Making claims to an area largely populated by Somali people, Somalia solicited the support of the United States.When the Soviet Union countered by sending arms and money to Ethiopia to help that country regain the lost territory in the Ogaden,the Somalis denounced their treaty arrangements with the Soviet Union and expelled its military forces from the country. At the same time, Ethiopia was confronted with the continuing rebel movement in Eritrea, which was supported by neighboring Arab nations.4 78 EARLY COMMITMENTS At first, administration officials tried a low-key approach to address these matters in the Horn of Africa. The Policy Review Committee, for example, on April 11, 1977, chose to rely on a memorandum that provided a nuanced analysis of the interests of the various parties in the area and suggested a primarily diplomatic approach for the United States.5 Later that summer the United States called on other nations to refrain from supplying arms to either party in the area, to strengthen their ties to the neighboring countries of Sudan and Kenya, to keep up a dialogue with the Somalis, and to maintain some influence relative to Ethiopia.The United States even backed two small aid projects to Ethiopia to show its concern for their people.6 Butthefollowingfall,asCubantroopsandSovietwarmaterielpouredintoEthiopia to back its war with Somalia over the Ogaden, the Carter administration began to express its concerns. In the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young spoke out against the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa.7 National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski briefed the press on“the growing Soviet-Cuban military presence.” By midNovember 1977,newspaper articles on this threat to the United States began to appear in the U.S. press.8 In addition, both Brzezinski and Vance voiced their concerns to Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. At a private dinner on December 14, 1977, Brzezinski flatly asserted that the continued influx of Cubans and Soviet war materials to Ethiopia would alter the U.S. position from that of restraint to a more active involvement in the Horn of Africa.9 At a later meeting Brzezinski suggested that the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia was a threat to the West, endangering “the safety of the transport links...