The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

3. Comparing Theories of Victory: Facing Off over Korea

THE CENTRAL PAIR OF CASES in this book examines crucial turning points in the Korean War: the U.S. decision to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea (chapter 4) and Mao Zedong’s decision to cross the Yalu River to meet the American forces (chapter 5). Both cases involve a similar assessment of the two sides’ military capabilities. For simplicity, therefore, this chapter examines the independent variable that applies to both chapter 4 and chapter 5: the differences between the two sides’ theories of victory on land. (The third case, Mao’s decision not to attack Taiwan in that same year, involves a rather different military calculation, and so the independent variable is treated entirely separately in chapter 6.) In this chapter I begin with an examination of American thinking about military effectiveness, turn to China’s views, and then contrast the two. I conclude by examining how each side viewed the other’s doctrine and summarize the very large differences between the two countries’ theories, thus making explicit the coding or characterization of doctrinal differences for this period to derive the independent variable for the cases discussed in chapter 4 and 5. the u.s. theory of victory on land The general American theory of victory in 1950 centered primarily on the use of strategic bombing and atomic weapons in a general war context. 3 comparing theories of victory facing off over korea 52 THE MILITARY LENS Additionally, American strategic thought emphasized the utility of tactical airpower, mechanized forces, and combined arms in the event of conventional war. strategic bombing in general... One of the key beliefs of American policymakers was the perceived effectiveness of strategic bombing in general. This view had its roots to the pre–World War II era and had changed little over time: An understanding of American air power and of the problem of aerial warfare can be achieved only in the context of cultural and intellectual history. The ways people have thought about air power proved so remarkably consistent, despite rapidly changing technology over a halfcentury , that a mere recital of a particular invention or an individual bombing raid sheds little light on the appeals and uses of air power. The bomber in imagination is the most compelling and revealing story.1 The lessons taken from World War II hardened this belief: “Immediately after the war, it appeared relatively certain that strategic bombing would be an integral part of any proper military effort.”2 This perception came out of the “formative common experience” held by senior military leaders from the previous world war.3 The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, conducted at the behest of President Roosevelt, came to a simple, sweeping conclusion: “Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe.”4 Indeed, even aside from atomic weapons, the Air Force continued to foresee an important role for conventional strategic bombing: “Many targets were not appropriate for scarce and expensive atomic weapons anyway, and a requirement would 1 The consistency and causal importance of these beliefs is the story told in Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), x. See also Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), chapters 4 and 8; Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 2 Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 31. 3 Michael Howard, as quoted in ibid., 30–31. 4 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War) (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, September 30, 1945), 16. The report on the Pacific War was similarly positive. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, July 1, 1946). COMPARING THEORIES OF VICTORY 53 continue for conventional bombing forces.”5 The utility of conventional strategic bombing in a campaign against China was thought to be high.6 ...and atomic weapons specifically Integral to and intertwined with the beliefs regarding the efficacy of strategic bombing was a confidence in the utility of atomic weapons. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs had important effects on American thinking about the usefulness...