The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

Index

index Acheson, Dean, 104, 112, 127, 151, 188 Almond, Edward, 78, 119 amphibious operations: and China, 173, 174–79, 181–85, 193, 195, 196; and U.S., 173–74, 177, 179, 181, 182, 184–85, 196 Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1956 to 1970s: and balance of power assessments, 216, 218, 222, 230; and doctrinal similarities, 9, 206–7, 230, 232; and Egyptian air force, 201; and false optimism, 201, 214, 215–16, 218, 225; militarized incidents of, 203, 204; and peace talks, 218–19; and Sinai Peninsula, 200, 202, 206, 209, 210, 214–15; summary of, 233; and surprise, 200, 202, 216, 218, 222–30, 223n110; and War of Attrition, 200, 202, 204, 208, 212–13 Arab-Israeli War of 1967, 9, 14, 15, 199, 201, 203, 205–8, 230 Arab-Israeli War of 1973: balance of power assessment in, 3, 9, 216, 218, 222, 223, 230; deterrence failure in, 232–33; and doctrinal-difference theory, 9, 14–15, 199, 200, 211–12, 232; and Egypt’s changes in doctrine, 208–12, 214, 217, 223–24, 227, 229, 230; and ground forces, 223–26; and Israel’s flawed counterattacks, 227–29; and Israel’s reliance on tanks, 207–8, 209; summary of, 233 Arquilla, John, 20, 28, 28n46, 29n47, 38 Assessing Intent Prediction, 41, 44, 132, 192, 219, 220 asymmetries: and bargaining failure, 4, 6, 234–35; China’s use of, 240–41, 242, 243, 250; and strategic coercion, 19 atomic weapons: and China’s policy changes, 165–66, 240, 242–44, 244n36, 245, 246–47, 247n48, 249, 250; and China’s theory of victory on land, 64–66, 64n709, 65n74, 66n82, 76, 82–83, 141, 144, 146–49; Mao Zedong on, 64, 65–66, 82, 135, 146, 147–48, 149, 166; U.S. arsenal of, 54–55, 54n16, 54–55n17, 56n25; and U.S. theory of victory on land, 53–56, 56n27, 60, 76, 82–83, 130, 145, 148, 148n49, 166, 240, 243–44, 244n36, 248, 249, 250 balance of power assessments: accuracy of, 6–7, 10; and Arab-Israeli conflicts, 216, 218, 222, 230; and China crossing Yalu River, 161; and China postponing invasion of Taiwan, 169, 195–96, 232; and doctrinal differences, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 235, 238, 244–46, 249, 250–51; and predictions of doctrinal-difference theory, 40–41, 43; and U.S. crossing 38th parallel, 113, 132 bargaining failure, 4, 6, 234–35 Note: Italic page numbers refer to figures and tables. 254 INDEX Betts, Richard, 37, 140 Blair, Clay, 94, 119, 121, 122–23 blitzkrieg warfare: and deterrence, 11; and Egypt, 199, 201–3, 209, 210; and Germany, 201, 233; and Israel, 199, 201–3, 207–8, 209, 210, 223–25, 227–28; and theories of victory, 21, 37 capability, 9, 10–11, 12, 45. See also balance of power assessments Central Military Commission (CMC) of China, 94, 94n29, 95, 96, 157, 176, 194 Chen Jian, 65–66, 65n74, 92n13, 135n4, 150n60 Chiang Kai-shek, 73, 75, 154, 158, 172n9, 186, 186n77, 193 China: civil war in, 8, 60, 63, 67, 68, 69–71, 74, 75, 76, 96, 169, 175, 177; Cultural Revolution , 155; deterrence of U.S. involvement in civil war, 95–96, 96n39, 152, 193; People’s War concept, 5, 7, 15; propaganda in, 60–61, 91–94, 103–4, 111; role in Korean War outbreak, 89, 90, 91, 97; Soviet alliance with, 148–49, 183; support of North Vietnamese, 233 China crossing Yalu River: and airpower, 165–66, 184n72; and atomic weapons, 146–49, 147n44, 148n49, 156, 165–66; beliefs regarding American intent, 149–53; and casualties, 157; and changes in doctrine , 162–64, 166; and Chinese interpretation of U.S. signaling, 144–56; confidence about conventional battles, 144–46; and deterrence failure, 7, 8, 51, 133; dissent in China, 153–56; and doctrinal difference on escalation, 232; historical background of, 135–37; postevent evaluations by the Chinese, 156–67; summary of, 233; and tactical level evidence for ground combat, 157–61, 158n93; and U.S. crossing 38th parallel, 134, 136, 137, 144 China postponing invasion of Taiwan: and balance of power assessments, 169, 195–96, 232; China’s interpretation of U.S. signaling, 192–95; and China’s theory of victory at sea, 172–79, 181–85, 196; historical background of, 169–70, 172; summary of, 233; and U.S. deterrence success, 14, 169, 195–96; and U.S. diplomatic signaling, 185–86; and U.S. military signaling, 8, 172, 172n9, 185–92, 187n82...