The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations

8. Implications for Theory and Dangers in the Taiwan Strait Today

THIS STUDY SHOWS how adversaries’ doctrinal differences can cause misperception and the failure of attempts at coercion or deterrence, leading to conflict, escalation, and war. In case after case—China, Israel, Egypt, and the United States—we see a country looking at the world through its own military lens and failing to see how the differences between its own and its adversary’s military doctrine could impede communication and accurate signaling. In three of the cases, this contributed to deterrence failure and escalation of conflict. In the two cases where the doctrinal differences were smaller, by contrast, communication was easier, misperceptions smaller, and conflict was less likely to escalate to war. For effective international communication, both sides must share a language of diplomacy. When the language of diplomacy and signaling includes military threats, differences in theories of victory can lead to problems in translation and thus to avoidable conflict. A nation’s policymakers in situations similar to those studied here—attempting to deter or compel an adversary with a different doctrine—would do better if they recognized the acute difficulties in such a project and adjust their policies and expectations accordingly. This final chapter summarizes the results of the five cases, highlights the arguments supported most strongly by each, and acknowledges some shortcomings of the cases and evidence. It then turns to the implications of this research for both theorists and practitioners. Finally, application of doctrinaldifference theory to contemporary Sino-American relations in the Taiwan Strait suggests similar dangers and raises cautions for the future. 8 implications for theory and dangers in the taiwan strait today 232 THE MILITARY LENS the record supports doctrinal-difference theory In three of the five cases examined in this book, deterrence failed and con- flict escalated where adversaries’ theories of victory differed deeply. The causal role of doctrinal difference on escalation is clear-cut in the case of the U.S. crossing of the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula, and played a supportive role in China’s willingness to cross the Yalu River and enter the war. In the third Sino-American case, the fact that the two sides’ theories of victory were similar facilitated their mutual communication of intent and of capabilities over Taiwan. In the Middle East cases, during the period of doctrinal similarity before the 1970s, there was no sign of misperception and underestimation, although other factors nevertheless led to war. In contrast, doctrinal differences played a major role in the outbreak of the 1973 war. The eleven predictions of the book’s theory set forth in chapter 2 thus received wide support in all five cases. By contrast, the conventional wisdom , framed here as the Weakness Hypothesis, received only mixed support: the strength or weakness of the signal did not correlate as closely to outcomes . Using both types of approaches together—Doctrinal-Difference and Weakness—would improve policy. In all five cases, the outcomes correlate with predictions based on the characterization of the adversaries’ theories of victory. This by itself would be thin evidence; much more convincing is the evidence that shows that the process by which the outcome was reached corresponds to the theory’s detailed predictions. The strongest evidence presented in each of the cases is process-tracing data. Evidence confirming specific predictions also pervades the historical record . In all five cases, the signals sent reflected the sending nation’s theory of victory; the military signals reflected the dominant doctrine on each side. Additionally, in the cases where a state’s attempts at coercion failed, there is copious evidence that in each case, the United States, China, or Israel was surprised by the effectiveness of its adversary, as well as by the limitations of its own forces: each side had high expectations of quick victory against its adversary. Instead, what each got was a bloody stalemate that did little to advance its national interests. There was evidence of shock regarding specific tactical issues, the strategic success of the opponent, and that the opponent was even involved in the conflict. All five cases thus support doctrinal-difference theory: significant differences between adversaries’ theories of victory did indeed lead to misperception , miscommunication, and miscalculation. In turn, these errors played important roles in key deterrence failures in the Korean War and the war of IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 233 TABLE 8.1 Results of Cases Case Doctrinal...