The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy

Conclusion

Conclusion The domestic controversy in the United States, which ended with the defeat of Kissinger’s vision, was one of the key factors in the crisis of détente , although not the only one and not necessarily the most important. It was relevant, however, because it intersected with other processes that embittered the relationship between the two superpowers and made dialogue more difficult. The Middle East, the third world, and the Soviet Union’s policies in its sphere of influence represented other theaters and issues in which the crisis of détente and, along with it, Kissingerism matured and then exploded. Between 1974 and 1975, Kissinger promoted a brilliant and unscrupulous diplomatic initiative in the Middle East that would determine a profound geopolitical realignment in the region. Egypt, the leader of the Pan-Arabic front and one of the main allies of the USSR throughout the Cold War, switched sides and became a close U.S. partner (as well as one of the main beneficiaries of American military aid). This change drastically altered the regional equilibria. Soviet influence in the Middle East was severely 146 The Eccentric Realist reduced. Despite détente, the battle for global hegemony was not fading, and the two superpowers had not abandoned the competition of the previous phase of the Cold War. In the Middle East, Kissinger acted with audacity, ability, and cynicism . The same impudence and unscrupulousness was also displayed— albeit with less ability—by the USSR in the third world, where renewed Soviet activism aroused U.S. and Western European diffidence and provided further ammunition to those who opposed détente and presented it as a new form of appeasement. Particularly in Africa, the Soviet Union saw the possibility of extending its influence and altering the global balance of power to its advantage. The Angolan civil war and, later, the clash between Ethiopia and Somalia seemed to offer new opportunities. In Angola, in particular, Moscow offered economic and military aid to the Marxist-inspired party MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola , or Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), one of the three factions involved in the bloody power struggle that followed the implosion of the Portuguese empire. Kissinger had frequently presented the Soviet Union as a status quo power, prone to respect the tacit rules of détente. He considered the new Soviet activism as a betrayal of détente, although he once again attributed the main responsibility for U.S. difficulties to domestic opponents, both liberal and conservative, who were unwilling to support friendly forces in Angola (the former) and were committed to a new anti-Soviet crusade that rendered mediation with the USSR impossible (the latter).1 Just like Kissinger’s policy in the Middle East, unscrupulous Soviet dynamism in theaters that were, until then, peripheral in the bipolar competition contributed to the crisis of détente. Soviet activism questioned the implicit assumptions of the U.S.-USSR dialogue, fueled and exacerbated regional crises that détente was supposed to prevent or consensually settle, and, finally, offered further arguments to those—Jackson, Reagan, and the neoconservatives—who opposed Kissinger’s strategy and denounced inherent Soviet expansionism. It is still difficult to reconstruct the discussions that took place within the Muscovite leadership and the real motivation behind actions that were, almost inevitably, destined to damage détente.2 What is clear is that the USSR once again proved itself unable to promote a farsighted foreign policy and understand—culturally as much as politically—how to relate to the United States. Conclusion 147 This deficit was even more manifest regarding the issue of human rights, which by the mid-1970s had fully entered international relations and world politics discourse. The repression of political dissent in the USSR and the Communist bloc caused genuine revulsion in the United States and Western Europe. Moreover, it offered an extraordinary propagandistic tool to opponents of détente. Moscow showed little or no awareness of this dynamic, as was evident by its reaction to Jackson-Vanik and the campaign promoted by Jackson and others in defense of Soviet dissidents . It is still debated whether the Soviet regime could have survived and preserved its sphere of influence if it had abandoned those practices that were characteristic of its relations with the satellite countries. It is evident , however, that in regard to human rights, Moscow...