The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion

Appendix A: Definitions

255 a p p e n d i x a Definitions S is religious (or exemplifies religion): (1) S takes there to be a reality that is ultimate, in relation to which an ultimate good can be attained. (2) S’s ultimate commitment is to the cultivation of dispositions appropriate to this state of affairs.1 S believes that p (or exemplifies propositional belief): S is disposed to apprehend the state of affairs reported by p, when that state of affairs comes to mind, under the concept reality.2 S believes in x (or exemplifies affective belief): (1) S believes that x has value or is in some way a good thing. Apart from a few slight revisions on the basis of more recent reflection, these definitions appear as they did in my Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), chaps. 1–6. Readers who find any of these definitions objectionable or unclear are invited to consult Prolegomena for discussion including crucial contextual information and responses to objections. 1 For the meanings of “ultimate” and associated terms, see the Introduction. 2 Earlier in the chapter from which this definition is taken, I give this alternative definition of “S believes that p”: “S has a disposition such that (normally) it is only in the thick sense that the state of affairs reported by p comes to mind for S.” By “the thick sense” should be understood the sense we are using when, in saying that someone has thought of a state of affairs, we mean that he has had a thought of the relevant arrangement of things being actual. This is to be distinguished from the “thin” sense, which we are using when in uttering the same sentence we mean only that the person has had a thought of what it would be like if the relevant arrangement of things were actual. 256 Appendix A (2) S is disposed, given the truth of (1), to experience a blend of approving, trusting, and loyal emotions toward x when x comes to mind. S exemplifies the religious belief that p: (1) S is disposed to apprehend the state of affairs reported by p, when that state of affairs comes to mind, under the concept reality. (2) p entails the existence of an ultimate and salvific reality. (3) p is independently capable of informing a religious practice. (4) S recognizes the religious character of her belief. S exemplifies affective religious belief: (1) S believes that a certain item x has value or is in some way a good thing. (2) At least a part of S’s reason for valuing x is that S values the existence of an ultimate and salvific reality or, more directly, the good obtainable in relation to such a reality, if it exists. (3) S is disposed, given the truth of (1) and (2), to experience a blend of approving, trusting, and loyal emotions toward x when x comes to mind. S exemplifies, with respect to p, religious disbelief: (1) S is disposed to apprehend the state of affairs reported by p, when that state of affairs comes to mind, under the concept reality. (2) p entails the nonexistence of an ultimate and salvific reality. (3) S recognizes the nonreligious character of her belief. S exemplifies affective religious disbelief: (1) S believes that a certain item x has disvalue or is in some way a bad thing. (2) At least a part of S’s reason for disvaluing x is that S disvalues the valuing of the existence of an ultimate and salvific reality Appendix A 257 or, more directly, disvalues the valuing of a good obtainable in relation to it, if it exists. (3) S is disposed, given the truth of (1) and (2), to experience a blend of disapproving and distrusting emotions toward x when x comes to mind. S exemplifies religious skepticism: S is in doubt and/or withholds judgment, on the basis of the apparent inconclusiveness of the relevant evidence, with respect to (i) this or that particular religious proposition or limited set of religious propositions (common skepticism), or (ii) the proposition that there is an ultimate and salvific reality (categorical skepticism ), or (iii) the proposition—qualified or unqualified—that human beings are capable of discovering at least...