In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

5 Begin's Peace Plan President Anwar el-Sadat's visit to Israel was concluded with an informal and private agreement between him and Menachem Begin. The agreement was based on three principles: (I) an end to war between the two countries; (2) the formal restoration of sovereignty over the Sinai to Egypt; and (3) the demilitarization of most of the Sinai, with limited Egyptian forces stationed only in the area adjoining the Suez Canal, including the Mitla and Gidi Passes.' The fact that this agreement was arrived at so quickly indicated Begin's desire to conclude a separate, formal agreement with Sadat. It was Sadat's insistence on a comprehensive agreement and a resolution of the Palestinian problem that prevented the concluding of a formal peace agreement between the two states during Sadat's visit to Israel. Nevertheless, the informal agreement that was reached promised the continuation of negotiations between the two states.' There was some understanding that the talks would be held in various capitals before the convening of the Geneva Conference.' Sadat's visit to Israel created a serious political dilemma for Begin. As far as he was concerned, withdrawal from the Sinai would mark the end of Israeli territorial concessions. But Sadat's insistence on resolving the Palestinian problem as well made Begin realize that further concessions were required. That is, the dilemma was how to achieve a political solution to the Palestinian problem that would satisfy Sadat without making territorial concessions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although the prime motive for adapting Israeli policy was the continued willingness to reach a separate agreement with Egypt, there were other motives as well. Begin indeed had a genuine desire to achieve a reasonable modus vivendi with the Palestinians. This meant, to him, an arrangement that would give the Palestinians their own self-chosen administration without any need for Israeli withdrawal. Such a political solution to the Palestinian problem was also perceived to be an appropriate response to the U.S. pressure on Israel regarding its presence in the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, it was widely perceived in Israel and abroad, that an urgent need existed to reciprocate Sadat's initiative . Begin believed that the new Israeli peace plan constituted the best way to do this." 62 Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 This chapter examines: (I) Israel's process of adaptation, which resulted in introducing the new peace plan; (2) the first attempts to gain legitimacy for a peace policy that was perceived to contradict Begin's basic belief system and ideological commitments; and (3) the initial domestic opposition to the peace plan. Israel's Process of Adaptation During the month that followed Sadat's visit to Israel, Begin began to adapt Israeli policy to the new circumstances created by the visit. This process was far from conforming to a "rational" or analytical mode of decisionmaking , which demands the acquisition of optimal information regarding the significant change, assessment of its significance in terms of rational interests, appraisal of the costs and benefits of every possible response, and specification of the alternative deemed most value-maximizing. In fact, Begin's process of adaptation was personal. He did not consult the government or the military establishment, including Minister of Defense Weizman and Chief of Staff Gur. Only Dayan, Attorney General Aharon Barak, and Begin's closest aides were let in on the secret of Begin's plans. Begin sought no assistance through teamwork, nor did he commission any military , strategic, or economic study. He even ignored the various alternative plans for peace with the Arabs that were prepared by the military establishment and introduced to him by Weizman on December 9, 1977.5 In essence, the severing of contact between Begin and the military establishment regarding resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict that began immediately after Begin's coming to power had continued." Begin's refusal to consider ideas, alternatives, and recommendations that did not fit his own basic philosophy led to difficult problems in defining and interpreting Sadat's initiative as well as in formulating a response to it. Each level in the Israeli decision-making group made its own attempt to interpret Sadat's statements and deeds, and the Israeli response as represented by Begin's peace plan did not reflect the conceptions of most of the Israeli decisionmakers . Nevertheless, this did not prevent Begin from gaining overwhelming support for his peace plan in the government and the Knesset. Begin's...

Share