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3 Sadat's Initiative Anwar el-Sadat's announcement on November 9, 1977, at the Egyptian National Assembly indicating his willingness to go to Jerusalem and negotiate directly with the Israelis marked a significant change in Egypt's foreign policy. Sadat's dramatic initiative was aimed at challenging Israel's basic foreign policy premise about Arab unwillingness to recognize Israel and resolve the ArabIsraeli conflict. Sadat hoped to force Israel to make an immediate change in its own foreign policy that would enable the emergence of a peace process between Israel and the Arab states: "I therefore decided to go right to the Knesset ... in order to submit to them the complete facts of the situation, and to confront them with the choice they would have to make if they really wanted to live in peace in this part of the world. I wanted to put the ball in their court.", Sadat's dramatic announcement also constituted a significant change in Israel's external environment; indeed, Sadat had succeeded in "putting the ball in Israel's court." However, many questions remained open for him: Would Israel see that there was now a ball in its court? If so, would Israel ignore the ball, or would it invite Sadat to come and play? Would Israel regard Sadat's initiative as a sincere and dramatic change in Egypt's foreign policy? Would Israel answer Sadat positively? This chapter argues that Israel indeed perceived Sadat's announcement correctly as indicating a major change, and because of that was ready to answer it immediately and positively, with Israel's actual invitation to Sadat to visit Israel; this constituted the first manifestation of Jerusalem's willingness to adjust to the significant change in its external environment. The change in Israeli foreign policy since Begin's coming to power, together with the direct and indirect exchanges between the two states from June to November, had made Israel more ready to answer Sadat positively. However, since those exchanges were known about only by Begin and Dayan, others in the Israeli decision-making group found it difficult to take Sadat's initiative seriously. Those who were responsible for the skeptical intelligence evaluation that was made were not aware of the secret exchanges with Egypt, and so could not be helpful to the decisionmakers in evaluating Sadat's initiative. Indeed, no serious discussion among the political, military, and intelligence elite was undertaken concerning 36 Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 the following issues: For what reasons had Sadat shifted his foreign policy? What sort of requests would he make? Did Sadat's initiative indicate readiness to accept Israel's goal of a separate peace agreement between the two states? What sort of concessions should Israel make in order to reciprocate Sadat? A Total Surprise Sadat's announcement surprised Begin and Dayan, because they had expected that Sadat would not accept a meeting with Begin, and certainly not in Jerusalem, until Begin committed himself in advance to withdraw from the territories ,' whereas Begin's refusal to do so had been passed on to Egypt. Nevertheless , there was some expectation that Sadat would be ready to resume the direct contacts with Israel. Both Begin and Dayan publicly expressed their surprise at Sadat's November 9 announcement, but they differed as to wherein the surprise lay and also regarding Israel's role in Sadat's decision. Begin stated that Sadat's willingness to meet with him did not surprise him at all; "the only surprising thing was his announcement that he was prepared to come to Jerusalem.'" Begin saw Sadat's announcement as a positive Egyptian response to his protracted attempt to signal Sadat. In an interview with Israeli Radio on November 16, 1977, he declared: "The initiative for the Egyptian president's coming to Jerusalem is basically an Israeli one. There were several Israeli initiatives, but the time is not ripe for their publication."" In a press conference on November 17, he added: "I, for my part, since I entered the prime minister's office, have not stopped in Israel or abroad sending what you journalists called 'signals' to President Sadat to the effect that I would like to meet him, to hold a personal meeting with him.'" Begin noted that Presidents Ceausescu and Carter had contributed to the breakthrough; he even stated, with exaggeration , that Carter had "created it."" Dayan, for his part, admitted that he was totally surprised by Sadat's announcement : "I did not expect a personal...

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