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CHAPTER FOUR American Intervention The Israeli-French nuclear connection of the late 1950s could be interpreted in terms of nuclear "sharing."' This followed the American -British sharing earlier in the 1950s, which may have made sharing with Israel seemjustified to the French. They may have seen Washington 's "collusion" with Moscow in regard to the abortive Suez War as further justification. Also, a French-West German-Italian nuclear program was discussed in 1957 (following the very same war).2 And it is possible that this connection was fully known to the Americans.3 In any event, it focused Israel's attention on Bonn as a rather important partner in France's own nuclear plans. The German link could complicate BenGurion 's domestic politics. Also there could be a possible Soviet campaign against such a development; and it could affect American deliberations in regard to West Germany-that is, how to give Adenauer some, but no real, nuclear "sharing," without pushing the Soviets too much. This very complex process was in the making when General de Gaulle took over. By all appearances, the Israeli-French connection was working well following de Gaulle's ascendancy in 1958, despite his insistence on a French "national bomb" (which by definition should be exclusive and for French interests only). According to available French sources, de Gaulle's own plutonium separation plant did not produce weaponsgrade plutonium before 1959, and the "national bomb" was not ready before 1960.4 Israel reportedly helped design it with the use of American -made computer equipment that Washington had refused to supply to the French.5 This alone may have justified de Gaulle's reciprocity, but it was not enough to win his fundamental support. At about this 61 62 The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East time, the French concluded that the secret French-Israeli cooperation agreement had become known, and de Gaulle's foreign minister presented Israel with an ultimatum:Jerusalem must make its nuclear plans public and agree to inspection by the IAEA (which came into being in 1957, the year that the original French-Israeli nuclear agreement had been signed) to safeguard the Dimona reactor against weapons production . If the Israelis disagreed with this ultimatum, the French would break the cooperation agreement. And, according to our French sources, without the cooperation agreement Israel would forfeit the missing reactor parts, the whole plutonium separation plant, and the deliveries of uranium for their half-finished reactor.6 This behind-the-scenes crisis with the French took place a couple of years after internal dissension had shaken the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) to its foundations. Though attached at that time to the Ministry of Defense, the IAEC had been created in the early 1950s, before the French connection with its intrinsic military potential was made. Several members of the IAEC were major scientists who were sworn enemies of the nuclear option, if misused. Other members were interested in basic research rather than in costly applied science. And still others wanted the Israeli nuclear effort to develop under their own control, or at least in their full knowledge and thus in cooperation with their opinions. In March 1958, the commission resigned, leaving behind Ernst Bergmann in his role as chairman.7 Professor Julio Rackach, doyen of Israeli theoretical physics and the mentor of many Israeli nuclear physicists, was among the prominent natural scientists who resigned. We know the official nature of Rackach 's objections: He refused to serve as a rubber stamp. For other Israeli scientists, of mainly German origin, nothing could justify the introduction of a nuclear option to the Middle East, a step that could portend a holocaust for everyone. Several of them, such as professors Markus Reiner and Shmuel Sambursky, were politically active among radical minority groups before Israel was born and either rejected the very concept of a Jewish state in Palestine or resented what they perceived as Ben-Gurion's "Jewish nationalism." Such people, after the Holocaust, could be mobilized to help create the Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine , but they still harbored doubts about the price of statehood and were, therefore, prone to set limits to that state. At the same time, Rackach and other intellectuals may have discerned threatening dictatorial traits in Ben-Gurion's behavior. They feared that, encouraged by Ernst Bergmann (a sort of "Dr. Strangelove" in their eyes) and his apparatchik , Shimon Peres, and in collaboration with the nationalist French, Ben-Gurion would be...

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