In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

CHAPTER 14 Reforming Israel's Voting Schemes GIDEON DORON Tel Aviv University and BARRY KAY Wilfrid-Laurier University I. Introduction Electoral rules are mathematical schemes that aggregate individual preferences and produce collective choices. A change in the definition of the scheme results, of course, in the production of different outcomes. When election outcomes do not favor some political players, or when individuals or groups believe that an alteration in the prevailing method may yield desired results from their perspective, then proposals for changing the way votes are aggregated and offices assigned are often made. Because in democracies there are always winners and losers, a built-in potential for electoral reform exists, and it is usually manifested in actual proposals for change. Electoral reforms-actual or proposed-are thus a common feature of political life in all democracies. Since the first election to the Constituent Assembly in 1949, the issue of electoral reform has been high on the agenda of certain of the Israeli politicians. Concern with this issue, however, expanded in the mid-1980s. It was intensified during, and due to, the negotiating excesses that occurred in forming and maintaining the government coalition in the twelfth Knesset The authors would like to thank Rebecca Kook and Avraham Brichta for their comments and helpful suggestions. 299 > Home | TOC | Index 300 Doron and Kay following the November 1988 election, and the March 1990 coalition crisis. Several popular movements were formed around this goal, and numerous public demonstrations accompanied it. The spirit of the reform was recognized by the Knesset itself. Agreements to reform the electoral system were signed between Likud and Labor in 1988 and between Likud and Tzomet in 1990. The intended change consisted of two elements. The first referred to a transformation of the current system, which selects Knesset members from national parties, to one that also includes local (i.e., district) representatives. The other involved direct election of the prime minister. This latter proposal was referred to as a "regime change," distinguishing it from the more commonplace effort to reform the electoral scheme. In March 1992, the Knesset adopted a law that required the direct selection of a prime minister by popular vote. It was decided, however, that the implementation of this law should take place alongside the election to the fourteenth Knesset scheduled to be held in 1996. This decision to support a system that resembles a presidential-type regime does indeed signifY a potential shift in the nature of the Israeli political dynamic. Other changes, however, less significant in their scope and impact, also occurred during the term of the twelfth Knesset. Among these, two have emerged as most important. The first involves a decision to increase the threshold level (e.g., blocking percentage) of votes necessalY to qualify for a Knesset seat from 1 percent to 1.5 percent of the popular votes. The second change occurred at the party level. Labor moved to democratize its nominating procedure. Instead of selecting its Knesset list in the party center, party members elected the head of the list and their candidates to the Knesset through a system of primaries. This chapter explores the reasons and explains the logic underlying the prevailing urge for change that has pervaded the Israeli political system. Its principle thesis is that while proposals for electoral reform may be based on some normative view people hold regarding political affairs, their actual design and practical implementation depends entirely on politicians' selfinterest and the power relationships that exist among them. The second part provides the theoretical orientation upon which this thesis rests for the construction ofits reasoning. In the third section the political background ofelectoral reform in Israel is presented. This is followed by two sections describing and analyling the two main proposals for electoral reform and the Labor primaries scheme. The evaluation of the political consequences of the actual and proposed reforms appears in the sixth part. We conclude by arguing that electoral changes will not, because they cannot, materially affect the substance and quality of Israeli politics and policy making and that such changes can be obtained only through a long term > Home | TOC | Index Reforming Israel's Voting Schemes 301 alteration of the country's political culture and a redefinition ofsome central elements that currently define the Israeli polity. II. Theoretical Framework Democratic schemes are designed to satisfy two basic purposes: (1) to enable an amalgamation of individual values such that the social choice will reflect them as much as possible and (2...

Share