Wittgenstein's Account of Truth

Contents

; Contents Abbreviations ix Preface xi Acknowledgments xv PART I FROM “MEANING IS USE” TO THE REJECTION OF TRANSCENDENT TRUTH 1 1. Wittgenstein’s Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism 2 2. The Positive Account of Truth 6 3. Antirealism Revisited 19 PART II FROM “MEANING IS USE” TO SEMANTIC ANTIREALISM 25 4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion 27 5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism 34 6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett 44 7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent 55 PART III WHY A REVISIONIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH? 59 8. Criteria and Justification Conditions 61 9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions 75 vii viii Wittgenstein’s Account of Truth 10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible 83 11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth 90 12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? 110 Notes 117 Bibliography 137 Index 145 ...