Kant on Causation: On the Fivefold Routes to the Principle of Causation

Chapter One: Relationships

Chapter One Relationships In this chapter I will deal with relationships. In particular, I will examine five relationships that are important for preparing the ground for the treatment of the Second Analogy proper. The first is the one between concepts and intuitions . In particular we will focus on the worries about the applicability of concepts (the pure concepts in particular) to sensible intuition that Kant expresses in the Schematism Chapter. In order to properly understand the nature of the principle of the Second Analogy we must heed the lesson of the Schematism Chapter. The second is the relationship between the Transcendental Deduction and the Principles of Understanding. The Principles of Understanding do not stand on their own. Instead they fit as an integral part of a whole task whose other main part is the Transcendental Deduction. In order to properly understand the principles, then, we must have some understanding of how they are connected to the task of the deduction of the categories. The third relationship I will examine is the relationship between principles of understanding and principles of reason. Since Kant utilizes both types of principles in his work, then in order to put things in the proper context, we need to be clear about the distinction between these two types. We also must be clear about which type of principle the Second Analogy is. The fourth relationship is the relationships we find within an analogy. The Second Analogy is one of the three principles named analogies. Kant tells us there is a reason for this name and in this third section I will examine his reasons for calling them analogies. The final relationship that must be discussed is the relationship between Kant and Hume. When dealing with the Second Analogy it is easy to overemphasize the importance of the relationship between Kant and Hume. The 1 2 KANT ON CAUSATION Second Analogy is often regarded as the central text in which Kant attempted to answer Hume’s skepticism concerning the causal principle, so naturally the relationship between Kant and Hume will be important when dealing with the Second Analogy. We should be clear, however, about two interrelated things. First, the Second Analogy alone cannot stand as a complete answer to Hume’s position on the causal principle.1 The Second Analogy itself is not a self-contained argument. The argument of the Second Analogy, especially when viewed as an answer to Hume, relies on crucial conclusions from other sections of the Critique. Secondly, the Second Analogy is more than simply a passage that Kant intended as an answer to Hume. The Second Analogy has a systematic role to play in the Critique as a whole. Overemphasizing its role as an answer to Hume tends to obscure this important role. CONCEPTS AND INTUITIONS The Schematism, along with the Metaphysical Deduction, is one of the most maligned sections of the first Critique. The Schematism Chapter, however, is an important one for Kant. According to Kant the Schematism makes possible the transition from the Pure Concepts of Understanding (categories) to the Principles of Pure Understanding.2 Some commentators, however, believe that the distinction between categories and principles is artificial and unnecessary . Since this distinction seems to be Kant’s reason for developing the Schematism in the first place, some argue that the Schematism too can be set aside as artificial and unnecessary. I argue, however, that the Schematism is far from being artificial or unnecessary. Instead it is best seen as a requirement of Kant’s general theory of concepts.3 Kant develops this theory as an alternative that he takes to be more plausible than the theories of either the Rationalists (as typified by Leibniz) or the Empiricists (as typified by Hume). Unfortunately, the Schematism’s role in this important project is easly overlooked because of the often confusing way Kant expresses his task in the opening four paragraphs of the Schematism Chapter. 1. Of course it should also be clear that the Second Analogy cannot stand alone as Kant’s resolution of his general disagreement with Hume. The scope of Kant’s criticisms of Hume go way beyond Hume’s views on causation. Of course Kant’s criticisms of Hume’s position on the status of the causal principle are part of his disagreement with Hume. Kant did believe that Hume’s mistake with regard to causation was symptomatic of the shortcomings involved with Hume’s empiricism. So the criticisms of Hume’s position on causation will...