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Chapter 5 The Concept of a Limited God In the mainline tradition of Christian thought the free will defense is set in the context of a theology which conceives of God as omnipotent. In most of the attacks upon the free will defense this doctrine of omnipotence has played a prominent role. The line of attack usually takes something like the following form: if God is truly omnipotent (or, indeed, if there be such a reality as an omnipotent God) then he could have arranged it so that there would be no evils; or, an omnipotent God could have arranged it so that humans would have free will and yet be so constituted in a world so constituted that there would be no evils, or at least fewer and less grievous evils. The connections between the doctrine of omnipotence and the problems it raises for the free will defense have been evident in our earlier chapters, perhaps in greatest detail in chapter 3 in which the challenge of Mackie and Flew is considered. It is my view that the traditional notion of God’s omnipotence, in spite of all of the ingenious efforts to reconcile it with the sort of human free will required by the free will defense, makes it impossible to rebut the attacks of Professors Flew and Mackie, and, moreover, makes it clear that God is ultimately responsible for the evils of the world. In this chapter I examine the traditional doctrine insofar as it is relevant for our discussion of the free will defense and to show why I have come to this conclusion. This will also require a look at traditional (and in my view futile) efforts to maintain the doctrine of omnipotence, while at the same time striving to couple it with some sort of notion of the limitation of God’s power.The very fact that traditional theologians have felt compelled to add something 39 about the limitations of God’s power should, I think, be taken as an indication of their own recognition of the cogency of the conclusion stated above. It is not surprising that these problems, which attend the doctrine of omnipotence, have led a number of thinkers to develop the notion of a limited God. There is, as we shall see, one view regarding such a limitation that has been incorporated into the orthodox tradition, namely, the notion that God has freely limited his own power in relation to morally significant human decisions. In general and apart from this tamed version, these efforts have been treated with scorn by more orthodox theologians. They have been regarded as totally unacceptable deviations from the Christian faith. In this present chapter I want to argue that, so far as the free will defense is concerned, there is already in the tradition, though not quite as explicitly and clearly as I should like, a notion of the limitation upon God’s power which has seemed adequate and necessary to the vast majority of free will defenders. This notion is not accepted by all branches of Christian theology; those who disagree are clearly in the minority and clearly find even greater difficulties in dealing with the problems mentioned above. The minority view I refer to is that held, for example, by Calvin (see pp. 24–28). Even within the Lutheran tradition, however, things had shifted considerably, as early as the influential work of Melanchthon,1 in the direction of the majority view. And today it is increasingly difficult to find, even in the tradition founded by Calvin, a defender of his divine determinism. I say that the view which has been accepted in the mainline of the tradition has seemed adequate to its supporters. However, we shall see that this view is far from clear and it is very doubtful that it serves the purpose of reconciling the notion of divine omnipotence with the sort of free will necessary to the free will defense. Nor will this majority of free will defenders be pleased with another point I want to make: namely, that even with this commonly accepted notion of the limitation on God’s power, the free will defender is still left with serious residual problems. In my final, and rather speculative chapter (chapter 8), I suggest the desirability and feasibility of a more radical notion of a limitation upon God’s power. A TRADITIONAL NOTION OF THE LIMITATION OF GOD’S POWER The traditional notion that I have in mind goes like...

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