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Chapter 3. The Game Begins
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Chapter 3 The Game Begins “Byastrangeparadox,meaningwouldisolatetheconcentratedpurity of its ex-pressiveness just at that moment when the relation to a certain outside is suspended.” —Jacques Derrida, La Voix et le Phénomène Modes of Logos, Modes of Chronos Parmenides’troublesomegameostensiblyunfoldsaccordingtotheschema he outlines briefly at 136a–c. In response to Socrates’ question as to the proper mode (tropos) of philosophical training, Parmenides indicates that the development of his dialectical demonstration will be determined by the following three pairs of oppositions: (1) what follows if the one exists, and what follows if the one does not exist. (2) Under each of these opposed conditions, what follows for the one and what follows for the others. (3) Under these opposed orientations, what follows toward-itself (pros hauto), and what follows toward-another (pros allo). But this eightfold oppositionality will itself be challenged by the odd nonpresence of the instant (155e–157b). The division of the exercise by the first of these opposed orientations indicates the significance of Parmenides’ exhortation to Socrates at 135e–136a that the consequences of the nonexistence of unity must be examined as well of its existence. If both the existence and the nonexistence of the one imply the same consequence, that consequence may be assumed to obtain. However, on the most literal reading of the explicit results as summarized by Parmenides, this dialogue achieves nothing but contradiction. A further complication arises from the fact that many of the arguments in the discourse on unity may be interpreted in both a fallacious and a nonfallacious way: Parmenides suggestively mimes sophistry throughout. This clue into the philosophical significance of the dialectical game may be developed in the following way. The ostensible results of the exam67 ination of the hypothesis of the existence of the one (137c–160b) must be compared to the ostensible results of the examination of the hypothesis of the one’s nonexistence (160b–166c). Whatever results follow from both the assumption of the one’s existence and from the assumption of its nonexistence may be regarded as at least ostensibly true. For if both p implies q and not-p implies q, then q is apparently true. The qualification arises from the fact that the inferences used to support these results are ambiguous. For this reason, we must regard the explicitly stated results which Parmenides summarizes at various junctures as ironic. Though Parmenides’ exercise differs in significant ways from his projected schema, it also remains true to the projection insofar as the game is structured throughout by oppositional orientations. By means of this differential or diairetical alternation of orientations—that informs both the projection of the exercise and the carrying out of it— Parmenides indicates the unusual persistence of archaic opposition even when the one is assumed to not exist. In this crucial respect, Parmenides’ provocative and indirect way of ale mtheia is unified with that which is disclosed by means of it. The reasoning in the sections (allegedly) exhibiting only disclosure oriented toward-itself (137c–142a; 159b–160b; 163b–164b; 165e–166c) is informed by the intention to isolate the singular meaning of a term. These sections ostensibly proceed by considering only what belongs to an intelligible meaning in itself, by eliminating other fundamental characters that are distinct from the nature in question. These passages are isomorphic insofar as isolating a singular meaning is shown to be impossible. However, the orientation toward singular meaning in itself—in every one of these allegedly pros hauto passages—only proceeds by way of its other: the orientation toward-another (pros allo). Moreover, the conclusion of these passages that follows from this (essential) mutual interpenetration of opposed orientations is the same in every case: for thinking, nothing exists in itself. These passages allude ironically to Socrates’ initial conception of separately existing eide minsofar as they get underway by attempting to consider only what is expressed in statements of identity depending on the subject’s own nature, as opposed to how this nature is related to others. Thus the first beginning (137c–142a) purports to show that the meaning of unity considered in itself does not imply and cannot without contradiction admit of plurality, being a whole of parts, being in time, etc. Parmenidesshowsthatvariouscharactersdonotbelongtothemeaning of unity (or plurality) considered in itself. The subject considered in 68 TROUBLING PLAY [54.81.33.119] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 21:37 GMT) itself, apart from time and existence, is shown to yield no knowledge, intelligibility , opinion, perception...