Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions

9. Repetitions

137 Chapter Nine
Repetitions I f the theme of movement connects Kierkegaard to the philosophical tradition that precedes him, in particular to Greek metaphysics and to Hegelian thought, it also illuminates the significance of his writing in relation to more recent thinkers. Indeed, one could argue that modern existentialism began in 1843 with the proclamation of repetition as the new category of truth, expressive of an actualizing movement as opposed to an idealizing movement. Focusing on the theme of movement should help us to read Kierkegaard in the context of a philosophical discourse concerning selfhood, power, and becoming that more usually looks to Nietzsche and Heidegger for guidance. The question of movement provides an enlightening starting point for comparing the writings of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, employs an evaluative vocabulary of power, strength, and vitality in opposition to the traditional philosophical interpretation of the truth as knowledge: he finds himself concerned with “nothing but questions of strength: how far to oppose truth and to reflect on its most questionable sides?”1 Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, nevertheless excavates Greek philosophy, takes a doctrine of movement—in his case, eternal recurrence— and applies it to the existing individual as a kind of ethical test.2 Nietzsche, like Kierkegaard, regards the existing individual as a center of power: “I require the starting point of ‘will to power’ as the origin of motion. Hence motion may not be conditioned from the outside—not caused—I require beginnings and centers of motion from which the will spreads.”3 Of course, Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God not only disconnects the self from any kind of transcendent ground, but also disregards the protective seal that Kierkegaard builds (or upbuilds) around inwardness. He rejects the notions of a ‘thing in itself’ and an inward subject, and instead offers a monist, expressivist vision of becoming: “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.”4 However, we may question whether this critique of essence undermines Kierkegaard’s particular interpretation of inwardness, which is not a being behind becoming or a subject underlying activity, but rather a movement of opening to becoming. More likely to divide the philosophers are their evaluative characterizations of two basic existential (op)positions: receptive versus self-centered (Kierkegaard), and active versus reactive (Nietzsche). These two orders of rank recognize not just degrees but qualities of power. Do their highest values, receptivity and activity—and their lower values, selfishness and reactivity—contradict or correspond to one another? One of the most important differences between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche lies in their estimation of the aesthetic approach to life. Nietzsche melts down the vertical axis of Kierkegaard’s spiritual movement and, in opposition to the supernatural repetition claimed by Christianity, proposes incessant renewal as the essence of nature itself. For Nietzsche, it is only on the basis of aesthetic criteria that individuals can infuse the indiscriminate power of nature with any kind of value. In relation to Nietzsche it no longer makes sense to speak of an aesthetic ‘sphere’ distinct from other modes of valuation: the power of beings (and the “good health” of the culture to which they belong) is measured by their creativity—by their ability to create values. This contrasts starkly with Kierkegaard’s denigration of the aesthetic as impotent and as inferior to the ethical and the religious, and also with his dismissal of repetition in the natural world. Despite these differences, however, both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche look to movement as a way of overcoming the nihilism that results from the PlatonicHegelian tradition of philosophy. Movement is integral to the existential task confronting the individual in a nihilistic age, whether this task takes the form of becoming a Christian or of creating values.5 In Difference and Repetition Deleuze presents a comparison between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche that addresses these issues. Regarding Nietzsche ’s account of the eternal recurrence as a form of repetition, he suggests that for both thinkers this is the movement that is to carry philosophy forward: “There is a force common to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche . . . Each, in his own way, makes repetition the fundamental category of a philosophy of the future.”6 Deleuze goes on to analyze the points upon which their movements converge: repetition is a way of liberation; 138 Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming it opposes the laws of nature...