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early as 1958, shortages in the paper industry were seen as a hindrance to the expansionary plans for Spanish publishing (Subcomisión del papel). And the new policies laid out in the decreto also required immediate changes in the approval process for the printing and distribution of books. These changes in turn were to result in the regime’s abandonment of a significant part of its own political agenda of the 1940s and 1950s: “during the Franco period, the censorship bodies underwent a series of restructurings that betray the regime’s ideological tension and shifts” (Labanyi 207). 1. THE NEW RULES OF CENSORSHIP The new printing and publishing law is a perfect example of the government ’s reformist attitude in the 1960s. The law removed the consulta obligatoria [compulsory submission] imposed on all printed works in Spain up to 1966, which often required publishers to delete sections and alter manuscripts; they replaced it with the consulta voluntaria [voluntary submission] and the déposito [deposit]. Joan Mari Torrealdai mentions that, under the regime of compulsory submission, publishers often faced a costly and lengthy approval process. They were required to submit complete books or galley proofs, and no deadlines were set for the government officials to respond (11). The costly production delays that resulted were a severe hindrance to the success of publishers in the booming and fiercely competitive book market of the 1960s and 1970s. For years they had begged for leniency when it came to the censorship rules; the 1966 law was the regime’s response to their demands. Fraga’s public statements about the new law, however, made it clear that he was still in charge: it was for him to administer the law and set its rules. The State continued to have the right to prohibit any material it deemed inappropriate; however, the new rules allowed for direct negotiation with the censorship authorities. For example, under the 1966 law, publishers (in theory) did not have to seek an explicit authorization to print books. Instead they could either “deposit” or “voluntarily submit” the complete text or galley proofs of the book for “final verification” by government officials , at which point it was now possible for negotiations to take place. Of the two options, voluntary submission was the safer way to gain approval from the censors, and became the preferred alternative for publishers like Carlos Barral (Almanaque 12–3), whose overt opposition to the regime’s censorship practices (which is clearly documented in the Archivo’s files), together with his astuteness and willingness to Publishing Matters 9 negotiate with the relevant authorities, make his case exemplary of the beneficial results these new practices brought to the Spanish publishing industry. By contrast, under the regulations for depósito, publishers could bypass the submission of a work for review merely by depositing six copies of the printed book at the Ministry and receiving official clearance for distribution. (Barral often used this option with the Boom writers.) By law, this process could not take longer than “one day per each 50 pages or fraction thereof” [“un día por cada cincuenta páginas o fracción”] (Prensa e Imprenta 85). However, this option carried considerable risk, since the law also included the possibility of secuestro [sequestration] as a measure to avoid the circulation of undesirable printed material: “el Ministerio Fiscal podrá ordenar el secuestro a disposici ón judicial del impreso o publicación delectivos donde quiere que éstos se hallaren, así como de sus moldes para evitar la difusión” [“The General Attorney’s Office may order the legal sequestration of any delinquent printed document or publication wherever they may be, together with the typesetter’s forms in order to avoid their distribution ”] (Prensa e Imprenta 64) For this reason the déposito option, while “allowing” book production to go ahead without the regime’s direct supervision, could backfire and result in significant economic loss. Some publishers nevertheless favored it because it offered the bureaucracy a finished product, a book ready to be marketed, with the expectation of a sort of up-ordown vote on the censors’ part. This made it an appropriate channel for publishers to test the government’s reaction to certain books they deemed “not censurable” (mostly foreign ones that they were considering for import or for potential Spanish editions). At the same time, it became a filtering device for the government to keep track of trends in the Spanish-language publishing industry. As a result of these new options...

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