U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror

2. From French Drill to Teutonic Initiative

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'.++Å'/&+ Every war has its surprises.—Arthur L. Wagner quoted in T. R. Brereton, Educating the Army By 1848, when the War with Mexico terminated in an American victory, Infantry Tactics had been the Army’s tactical doctrine for thirty-three years. Based upon French ideas, the manual had proven its worth assisting the Army attain national policy objectives in service to an embryonic continental power. The bedrock of warfighting practice during an era of national expansion, the manual’s precepts allowed army officers to regulate the actions of soldiers in peace and war. For their part, soldiers learned to precisely execute specific tactical movements when directed. With a life span of just over three decades, the Army’s tactical drill system was well-known but not enforced among all regular, militia, and volunteer units. Commanders could use the manual or not, for the War Department was incapable of enforcing any doctrinal standards upon dispersed federal forces and state governments. Army leaders also found that Infantry Tactics, a conventional warfare doctrine by design, was awkward when confronting Indians. Without an overarching tactical doctrine to regulate every plausible mission, army leaders habitually combined convention with informal practice, two very different approaches to war that existed simultaneously.1 Doctrine was not the concern of newly appointed Secretary of War Jefferson Davis in March 1853, at least initially. As a West Point graduate, infantryman, and Mexican War veteran, he understood that more urgent matters outweighed rewriting army doctrine to cover every conceivable mission. In addressing service organization, strength deficiencies, and foreign threats, his policies included convincing Congress to fund two additional infantry regiments and two more cavalry regiments. To rectify the 64 : CHAPTER TWO difficulty of controlling a vast geographic area with overextended forces, Davis sought larger but fewer frontier garrisons. Politics prevented Davis from achieving his goal. Still, he created five military districts where commanders redistributed their forces, as they deemed fit. In regards to threats of foreign invasion, Davis convinced Congress to pay for additional coastal fortifications. Secretary Davis soon found himself facing additional national-security problems that emerged from European rifle technology. For decades, musket-dominated armies had periodically used rifled weapons. Extensive use of rifles was unheard of, however, for they were expensive and prone to fouling. By 1849, industrialization had helped to reduce manufacturing costs. French Captain Claude Etienne Minié produced a viable rifle-and-bullet combination that others had experimented with in the 1830s. Eventually, the French MLE 1853/54 rifle allowed a small conical lead bullet to be rammed down the muzzle. When fired, the projectile expanded to catch helical grooves inside a rifled barrel. Upon exit, the bullet spun, increasing the projectile’s accuracy, lethality, range, and stability. Originally, Minié designed a two-piece projectile, but later refinements by others led to the development of a one-piece, hollow-core expandable lead bullet. The term “Minié ball” or “minnie ball,” however, stuck. Used in abundance, this weapon/bullet combination made distinctions between heavy and light infantry meaningless. It also signaled the decline of mounted forces such as cavalry and dragoons.2 European rifle technology convinced Davis that warfare was about to change drastically. In anticipation of a dramatic shift in tactics, Davis formed a board of officers in November 1853 to write new doctrinal procedures to replace the musket-oriented Infantry Tactics. Davis chose Brevet Lieutenant Colonel William J. Hardee, West Point Class of 1838, to lead the effort. Identified early on as a wunderkind, Hardee had attended the French Cavalry School at Saumur, France, in the early 1840s. There he mastered both French and army drill. Hardee’s subsequent courageousness in Mexico, coupled with a knack for the nuances of tactical maneuver , earned him a faculty position at West Point. In 1853, he became an academy tactics instructor. As a master tactician possessing knowledge of French military procedures and language, Hardee was more than qualified for his assigned task. Yet, he was a cavalry officer; quite possibly chosen not only due to his experience and intellect but also to devise procedures to lessen the rifle’s effect upon American mounted troops. Regardless, William Hardee (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania...