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FIVE Sorties Once rural citizens had been evacuated to a place of refuge, and the enemy was in control of the countryside, as a result of either victory in hoplite battle or default, the invaded still had one last-and very goodchance of impeding ravagers. Well-organized, sudden sorties, usually made up of cavalry troops,l could issue forth from the city, not only forcing the enemy hoplites to remain in formation, but also going after light-armed ravaging patrols who were dispersed throughout the countryside . (See updated commentary, page 230 [Cavalry against Ravagers ].) Theoretical treatises about military tactics and strategy give much attention to such sorties and express confidence that even a small, closely disciplined mounted force could successfully keep the enemy on their I. Cavalry in Greece during much ofthe classical age played a subservient role to infantry. Lack of good pasturage, poor breeding, difficult terrain, and the absence of stirrups and strong saddles all in varying degrees made the independent use of a shock cavalry corps impossible (cf. Adcock 1957, 48-5°; Anderson 1970, 57-58; Gomme I: IS; Grundy 1948, 277-279; Kromayer and Veith 1928, 53-54). But mounted troops could be effective against isolated bands of ravagers; we rarely hear ofhoplites alone on such patrols. They were, of course, cumbersome, slow, and vulnerable to counterattack. 122 Sorties / I 2 3 guard and protect property and some farmland outside the walls. Xenophon, in his essay on the cavalry commander, outlines the general operation of such patrols: It seems to me that the commander's job is to keep his men always prepared for action, and yet out of sight, watching for any mistake the enemy might make. There is a tendency that the more numerous the soldiers, the more numerous are the mistakes they make. For either they scatter out of a need for provisions or in utter disorder some march too far ahead while others lag way behind. All these mistakes the cavalry commander must capitalize on; if he doesn't, the entire country will fall into enemy hands. And once he decides to strike, he must be very careful to retreat well before the main enemy reinforcements arrive. (Hipp. 7.7-10) Aeneas Tacticus suggested a rather elaborate, if not idealized plan to check ravagers: Meanwhile, some of the enemy troops break up into small patrols to ravage the countryside; others lie in wait, hoping to ambush some ofyour relief forces who arrive in disorder. Therefore, there is no need to rouse the invaders with an immediate engagement . Instead, allow them first to feel secure, and, in utter contempt of you, to rush after booty and loot. At this time, they will be gorged with food and sated with drink; in their drunkenness,2 they will soon be in no shape to fight and will retreat if you can catch them at the right moment. For when you've assembled your relief sortie at the announced place, then you must immediately attack, cut off their retreat with your horse, set up ambushes with your special forces, engage them with your light-armed troops, and, next, bring up your heavy infantry in close formation right after. (16.4-7) 2. Wine stored in vats was difficult to remove, and so often left behind. Also, abandoned alcohol might sometimes have the (intentional?) effect ofundermining discipline among enemy ravagers (see Xen. Hell. 6.2.6). 124 / Defense ofAgriculture Such theorists were not postulating these ideas out of thin air. Rather, they derived their thoughts from the exper,ience of Greek warfare , where the vulnerability of ravagers to well-organized cavalry sorties was an established fact. A classic example occurred in 381 B.C., when an Olynthian raiding party descended on Apollonia and pillaged the countryside. At that point, Derdas, who was in charge of a squadron of defensive troops at Apollonia, kept quiet, keeping his horses ready for action and their riders armed. But when the Olynthians carelessly drove on, not only into the suburbs, but even to the very gates of the city, then in good order he rode out to the attack. As soon as the enemy saw him, they broke and ran. But Derdas, when once the rout had begun, did not cease pursuing and killing for ninety stadia, until he chased them right up to the city walls of Olynthos. (Xen. Hell. 5.3.1 - 2 ) Similarly, a very small Phliasian cavalry patrol (sixty in number) was able to sally forth from...

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