Of Rule and Revenue

Appendix to Chapter 2: Excursus on the Acquisition of Rule

A P P E N D I X T O C H A P T E R I I Excursus on the Acquisition of Rule Before Iproceed to the analysis ofrevenue production policies, let me take a quick detour to try out the theory of predatory rule on one of the primary issues of political theory: the question of state formation. Rarely, if ever, in history has a state emerged full blown from society. In general, the term state formation refers to the consolidation or takeover of an organization that already performs at least some of the functions of a state. Nonetheless, the analysis of the related processes of formation and transformation remains an important aim of theoretical inquiry, and there are, consequently, innumerable theories of state genesis, ranging from relatively concrete and historical accounts1 to philosophical exercises on the emergence of government from the state of nature.2 One common argument is that the state evolves as a specialized agency of justice and protection when the population of a society exceeds that of a community able to engage in face-to-face interactions and generalized reciprocity. Once in place, the state makes it more likelythat the society will survive and 1 Anthropological accounts include Carniero (1970), Service (1975), Wright (1977), and Cohen and Service (1978). Sociologists and historianshave also explored the question of state formation and transformation.For example, see Bendix (1978), Moore (1966), Anderson (1974a), Poggi (1978), Tilly (1975, 1985), and Mann (1977). While the anthropologists tend to focus on the emergence of an institutionthat can be labeled a state, these analysts tend to investigate the emergence of the modern state. One theorist who addresses the question across many time periods and countriesis, of course, Weber ([1922] 1968). 2 Politicalphilosophers addressthe question of state emergence in still another way. The great works in this literature abound, but among the most important older texts are Hobbes ([1651] 1962), Locke ([1690] 1968), and Rousseau ([1762] 1950). 41 42 Of Rule and Revenue grow without splintering. There is considerable debate about what the relevant size is and what determines it.3 The focus here, however, is not so much on state formation itself as on how rulers achieve and maintain control over the state apparatus. What is clear, from Hobbes to modern-day anthropologists, political sociologists, and economic historians, is that the first step in the process of state creation is to build a monopoly of organized violence. Both the provision of protection and the ability to engage in war are crucial aspects of state making, and both depend on the extraction of sufficient resources to pay for organized violence (North and Thomas 1973; North 1981; Tilly 1985). The great economic historian Frederick Lane argued (1958, 402) that "the violence-using, violence-controlling industry was a natural monopoly at least on land. . . . A monopoly of the use of force within a contiguous territory enabled a protection-producing enterprise to improve its product and reduce its costs." Both economies of scale in violence and the use of superior military capacity to defeat enemies enable government to monopolize protection. But who benefits from this monopoly variesover time and place. So, too, does the ability of rulers to extract a surplus or, alternatively,to extract so much that the payer can no longer maintain production (Lane 1958,403). The causes of variationliein the political, economic, and military resources possessed by constituents and agents—that is, as Lane puts it, who "owns" the monopoly or, as I prefer to think about the issue, who can bargain with and/or control the predatory ruler. Persons who wish to attain and maintain positions of rulers almost always face rivals. Much of history is the story of potential rulers vying for leadership of a state organization, and conflict seldom ceases with victory. Elected officials rarely lack opponents. Monarchs often worry about the Macbeths and Richard Ills within their courts. Demagogues and charismatic leaders fear that another will prove more compelling than they. The internecine struggles that marked the Middle Ages in Europe, the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries in Japan, and the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in China are evidence of the difficulties faced by leaders who attempt to impose their rule in the face of strong competitors with relatively equal resources. Challengers from subjected populations can also put a ruler's position in jeopardy. Rulers aim to develop sufficient coercive capacity to defeat rivals and maintain control over the countrysidedefined as their territory. Only in the...